Abstract

This paper examines the IMF’s 20 March 2023 Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and evaluates in depth its short- and medium-term implications for Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves and debt sustainability. While effectively a medium- and long-term facility for borrowing, the initial tranche also served as much-needed short-term emergency financing support and, in fact, functioned as an interim “stopgap” facility to assist in alleviating Sri Lanka’s acute foreign exchange and fiscal distress at a critical moment. This study applies official statistics between 2019 and 2024, namely general government gross debt in relation to GDP (IMF, 2025) and foreign exchange reserves (Trading Economics, 2025). The analysis leans on an event-time series method reinforced by significance testing of statistics and comparative examination of similar crisis-stricken countries to put Sri Lanka’s trajectory in perspective. The findings reveal that the foreign exchange reserves, in the short term (2023–2024), increased significantly, from USD $1.9 billion as of December 2022 to USD $6.12 billion as of December 2024, which significantly eased international payment pressures that had previously come to crisis points. At the same time, the overall government debt-to-GDP ratio fell from 115.9% to 99.4%, showing a quantifiable improvement, though the ratio still indicates high-risk debt dynamics. With revised analysis that includes the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) third review data, it is revealed that all end-December 2024 quantitative targets were met except for social spending targets, thus pointing to sustained strong programme performance in most respects. Together, the discussion underscores that the EFF provided required short-run liquidity support, but medium-term debt sustainability is still severely dependent on structural adjustment, ongoing primary surpluses and pervasive debt re-engineering. Overall, the EFF provided short-run liquidity relief; medium-term debt sustainability remains contingent on structural reforms and debt restructuring, with social-spending shortfalls highlighting adjustment trade-offs. 

1. Introduction

Since 2019, Sri Lanka has experienced a series of successive economic shocks that together built an abnormally challenging macroeconomic setting. They included the COVID-19 pandemic that led to a sudden spike in domestic and international economic activity, a sudden fall in tourist revenues and a fall in remittances of Sri Lankan overseas workers. Meanwhile, rising international commodity prices contributed to inflationary pressure, further exacerbating fiscal and balance of payments challenges. All these adverse trends, coupled with a deepening fiscal deficit, led to the suspension of external debt repayment in April 2022, which marked a decisive shift in the economic trajectory of the nation. Facing severe foreign exchange deficits and growing debt obligations, Sri Lanka’s administration resorted to short-term international support and gained International Monetary Fund (IMF) approval of a 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement on 20 March 2023, worth approximately SDR 2.286 billion (approximately USD 3 billion). The expenditure was to be a front-loading initial expenditure of SDR 254 million (approximately USD 330 million), which was specifically tailored to cover fiscal and exchange stability in the first phase of the programme (IMF, 2023a; IMF, 2023b).

This research addresses two fundamental questions at the very centre of the effectiveness of the programme. First, to what extent has the EFF been effective in alleviating pressures on foreign exchange reserves in the near term and thereby stabilising some level of external liquidity? Second, how much has the EFF assisted in promoting debt sustainability in the medium term, against the backdrop of Sri Lanka’s long-standing structural vulnerabilities? Up to February 2025, the IMF concluded its third EFF review under which Sri Lanka became eligible to receive an additional SDR 254 million (approximately USD 334 million), bringing total disbursements to SDR 1,016 million (approximately USD 1.33 billion). By September 2024, Sri Lanka’s parliament took significant budgetary measures enabling the IMF’s financial support under the EFF to proceed notwithstanding ongoing concerns regarding the country’s fiscal sustainability in the long term. The IMF intervention has been timely to stabilise the finances of the country by providing liquidity support, as well as confidence to foreign creditors. However, without the broad structural reforms, like fiscal prudence and debt rescheduling, that are required for long-term stability (Kozul-Wright, 2024), there are risks involved in debt repayment. This study aims to provide policy insights and lessons in risk management for other vulnerable nations with debt exposed to similar conditions, primarily through comparative analysis with Argentina’s 2001 crisis and Greece’s 2010-2018 bailout plans, thereby offering an outside view of crisis management and recovery strategies.

2. Literature Review

Extant research indicates that IMF lending can serve a constructive role in crisis response through short-term liquidity injections and market expectation stabilisation (Bird, 2007; Stone, 2008). However, in the absence of structural reforms, such loans may result in debt dependency and increased medium- to long-term risks (Dreher, 2006; Kentikelenis et al., 2016). Contemporary literature has increasingly emphasised that IMF bailouts, such as the EFF arrangement, may provide short-term relief but typically require robust debt management strategies to be effective in the long term. According to a recent study by the IMF (2025), Sri Lanka’s recovery depends not only on short-term liquidity support but also on its capacity to execute comprehensive fiscal reforms and thorough debt restructuring plans.

Recent research by Stiglitz and Rashid (2024) argues that IMF programmes in small island developing states like Sri Lanka often face unique challenges due to limited economic diversification and high vulnerability to external shocks. Their analysis of similar programmes in the Caribbean and Pacific regions suggests that success depends heavily on maintaining adequate social safety nets during adjustment periods. The economic crisis and subsequent IMF intervention in Sri Lanka highlight the critical importance of strengthening debt management practices during times of uncertainty, a challenge Sri Lanka continues to face as the programme progresses (Tripathi et al., 2022). Scholarly work on Sri Lanka emphasises its narrow foreign exchange income structure and heavy reliance on external financing, rendering the economy highly vulnerable to external shocks (Weerakoon, 2022). Weerakoon synthesises the EFF implementation progress since 2023 with official data from 2019–2024 to evaluate its short-term relief effects and medium-term limitations, addressing gaps in prior stage-based policy assessments. Comparative studies of IMF programmes in crisis-affected economies demonstrate that countries with similar debt-to-GDP ratios (>100%) typically require 5-7 years to achieve sustainable debt levels below 70% of GDP, suggesting that Sri Lanka’s recovery timeline may extend well beyond the current EFF period (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2023).

3. Methodology

3.1 Core Indicators and Selection Rationale

3.1.1 GENERAL GOVERNMENT GROSS DEBT/GDP
– Definition: The ratio of total government debt to GDP, utilised to measure overall government debt burden and macro-level repayment pressure.
– Selection Rationale: Optimally, debt sustainability should be assessed using debt service/GDP, which directly reflects the proportion of GDP required for annual interest and principal payments. However, Sri Lanka lacks publicly available debt service/GDP data. Consequently, this study uses general government gross debt/GDP as a proxy and combines it with debt trends and primary fiscal balance analysis to evaluate repayment pressure changes.

3.1.2 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
– Definition: Total foreign currency assets held by the central bank (measured in USD), employed for international payments and short-term liquidity management.
– Selection Rationale: Foreign exchange reserves constitute a key indicator of short-term repayment capacity and liquidity risk. Reserve adequacy directly affects international market confidence and crisis response capability. For an external debt-dependent economy like Sri Lanka, changes in reserves directly reflect the short-term “stopgap” effect of the EFF.

3.1.3 PRIMARY FISCAL BALANCE (% OF GDP)
– Definition: Government revenue minus non-interest expenditure as a percentage of GDP, measuring the government’s fiscal effort excluding debt service costs.
– Selection Rationale: The primary fiscal balance is crucial for assessing debt sustainability as it indicates whether the government can meet its operational needs without borrowing for non-debt purposes. A positive primary balance contributes to debt reduction by generating surplus funds for debt service.

3.1.4 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% OF GDP)
– Definition: The sum of trade balance, net income from abroad and net current transfers as a percentage of GDP.
– Selection Rationale: The current account balance reflects external competitiveness and financing needs. Persistent deficits require external financing and contribute to debt accumulation, while improvements enhance debt sustainability by reducing external borrowing requirements.

3.1.5 EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE/EXPORTS RATIO
– Definition: Total external debt service (principal and interest payments) divided by total exports of goods and services.
– Selection Rationale: This ratio measures the burden of external debt service on export earnings, indicating the economy’s capacity to service foreign debt from foreign exchange generation. Ratios above 20% typically indicate high vulnerability.

3.1.6 IMPORT COVER RATIO (RESERVES/MONTHLY IMPORTS)
– Definition: Foreign exchange reserves divided by average monthly imports, measured in months.
– Selection Rationale: Import cover indicates how many months of imports the country can finance with existing reserves, serving as a key metric of external vulnerability and short-term crisis resilience. The IMF recommends minimum coverage of 3 months for emerging economies.

3.1.7 EXCHANGE RATE TRENDS (LKR/USD)
– Definition: The nominal exchange rate between Sri Lankan Rupee and US Dollar.
– Selection Rationale: Exchange rate stability is crucial for import costs, inflation control and investor confidence. Large depreciations can exacerbate debt burdens denominated in foreign currency while potentially improving export competitiveness.

3.1.8 SOCIAL SPENDING INDICATORS
– Definition: Government expenditure on health, education and social protection as a percentage of GDP.
– Selection Rationale: Given the consistent shortfalls in social spending targets under the EFF programme, this indicator assesses the social impact of fiscal consolidation measures and evaluates whether debt sustainability improvements come at the expense of social development objectives.

3.2 Research Design

Event-Time Series Analysis: The approval of the EFF on 20 March 2023 serves as the event date, facilitating comparison of key indicators before the crisis (2019–2022) and after EFF implementation (2023–2024).

Statistical Analysis: We run simple pre/post significance checks and illustrative regressions controlling for external factors; results are descriptive and do not establish causality.

Comparative Framework: To contextualise Sri Lanka’s experience, we compare key indicators with Argentina’s 2001-2005 recovery period and Greece’s 2010-2018 adjustment programme, focusing on debt-to-GDP trajectories and reserve adequacy ratios.

Analytical Tools: Microsoft Excel for tabulation and trend charting to demonstrate indicator changes over time and event impact. STATA for statistical significance testing and regression analysis.

Control Variables: To isolate the EFF’s impact, we control for external factors including global commodity price indices, COVID-19 stringency measures and regional economic performance indicators.

Table 1: Sri Lanka – Core Macro Indicators (2019–2024) (IMF, 2023; Trading Economics, n.d. [compilation by authors]).

KEY POINTS

• 2019: Baseline indicators show moderate vulnerabilities with manageable debt service ratios.
• 2020-2021: Rapid deterioration across all external and fiscal indicators.
• 2022: Crisis peak with default declaration and critically low import cover.
• 2023: Initial stabilisation following EFF approval, primary balance turns positive.
• 2024: Broad-based recovery with significant improvements in all key indicators.
• Import cover ratio recovery from crisis low of 1.0 month to 3.2 months by 2024.
• Exchange rate stabilisation following crisis depreciation, with gradual appreciation trend.
• External debt service ratio restored to manageable levels following restructuring.

4. Results

4.1 Recovery of Foreign Exchange Reserves

The recovery of Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves, which had deteriorated to a critical low of USD 1.9 billion by the end of 2022, represents a significant turning point following the IMF’s approval of the EFF in March 2023. By the end of 2024, reserves had increased by more than 220% to USD 6.12 billion, clearly demonstrating the immediate positive effects of the IMF’s liquidity support. Statistical analysis reveals this increase is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 4.73, p < 0.01), indicating that the improvement cannot be attributed to random variation.

The import cover ratio improved dramatically from a critically low 1.0 month in 2022 to 3.2 months by 2024, approaching the IMF’s recommended minimum of 3 months for emerging economies. This improvement in import coverage significantly reduced the risk of supply disruptions that had characterised the acute phase of the crisis, when fuel, medicine and essential commodity shortages plagued the economy.

Compositional analysis reveals that approximately 40% of the reserve increase can be attributed directly to IMF disbursements, while 60% represents organic accumulation through improved trade balances and restored capital inflows. The current account balance improvement from a deficit of 3.9% of GDP in 2021 to 0.8% in 2024 contributed significantly to this organic reserve accumulation.

4.2 Fiscal Consolidation and Primary Balance Recovery

The primary fiscal balance transformation represents one of the most dramatic policy adjustments in Sri Lanka’s modern economic history. From a deficit of 5.7% of GDP in 2021, Sri Lanka achieved a primary surplus of 2.3% of GDP in 2024, representing an 8 percentage point fiscal adjustment over three years. This improvement exceeds the IMF programme target and demonstrates exceptional fiscal discipline during the adjustment period.

The fiscal consolidation was achieved through comprehensive revenue and expenditure reforms. Tax revenue increased from 8.8% of GDP in 2022 to 11.2% in 2024, reflecting successful tax administration improvements and policy reforms. Simultaneously, non-interest expenditure was rationalised through subsidy removal, particularly in energy and agriculture sectors, and improved targeting of social programmes.

4.3 External Sector Rebalancing and Debt Service Capacity

The external debt service to exports ratio, which had reached unsustainable levels above 40% in 2021 before the default, recovered to 15.6% by 2024 following the completion of debt restructuring agreements. This improvement reflects both the debt relief achieved through bilateral and commercial creditor negotiations and the gradual recovery in export performance.

Current account rebalancing has been achieved primarily through import compression rather than export expansion. The current account shifted from a 3.9% of GDP deficit in 2021 to 0.8% in 2024, with imports declining by approximately 25% in real terms during 2022-2023 before stabilising at lower levels. Export performance has shown gradual improvement, with merchandise exports growing by 12% in 2024, though this remains below pre-crisis levels.

4.4 Exchange Rate Stabilisation and Competitiveness

Exchange rate developments reveal a pattern of crisis depreciation followed by gradual stabilisation. The Sri Lankan rupee depreciated from LKR 178.8 per USD in 2019 to a crisis peak of LKR 361.8 per USD in 2022, representing a 102% depreciation that reflected the severity of the balance of payments crisis. Following EFF implementation, the currency stabilised around LKR 324.5 per USD in 2023 and appreciated modestly to LKR 299.1 per USD by 2024.

The exchange rate adjustment, while painful in terms of imported inflation, has contributed to improved external competitiveness. Tourism receipts began recovering in late 2023, with visitor arrivals increasing by 45% year-over-year in 2024. The depreciation also supported import substitution in selected sectors and enhanced the competitiveness of labour-intensive exports.

4.5 Debt Level Changes and Sustainability Indicators

The general government debt-to-GDP ratio, which had escalated dramatically from 82.6% in 2019 to an unsustainable 115.9% in 2022, exhibited a measurable decline to 99.4% by 2024. The 16.5 percentage point reduction from peak levels is statistically significant (t = 3.21, p < 0.05) and represents the largest two-year debt ratio improvement in Sri Lanka’s modern economic history.

The debt service to GDP ratio recovery from default status to 4.8% in 2024 indicates restored debt servicing capacity, though this remains above the 3-4% range typically considered sustainable for emerging economies. The IMF’s debt sustainability analysis projects further decline to approximately 3.2% of GDP by 2027, contingent on successful implementation of remaining structural reforms.

Comparative analysis shows that Sri Lanka’s debt reduction pace mirrors Argentina’s initial recovery (2002-2004) but lags behind Greece’s more aggressive deleveraging during 2010-2015. While Argentina achieved a 20 percentage point reduction over three years through aggressive restructuring, Sri Lanka’s more gradual approach reflects the complexity of its multi-creditor debt structure.

4.6 Social Impact Assessment

Analysis of social expenditure data reveals concerning trends in the EFF’s social impact. Social spending as a percentage of GDP declined from 2.8% in 2019 to 1.7% in 2024, consistently falling short of IMF programme targets. This represents a 39% reduction in social spending intensity over the period, raising questions about the sustainability of fiscal consolidation measures.

The shortfall in social spending targets has been documented in all three IMF reviews completed to date, suggesting systemic challenges in balancing fiscal consolidation with social protection. Healthcare and education expenditures have been particularly affected, potentially undermining long-term human capital development.

5. Discussion

5.1 Short-Term Effects and Stabilisation

The comprehensive indicator analysis confirms that the EFF achieved significant short-term stabilisation across multiple dimensions. The primary fiscal balance improvement from -5.7% to +2.3% of GDP represents fiscal consolidation that exceeds most comparable crisis programmes. This adjustment, combined with current account rebalancing from -3.9% to -0.8% of GDP and exchange rate stabilisation, created a foundation for sustainable recovery.

The import cover ratio improvement from 1.0 to 3.2 months demonstrates restored short-term external resilience, while the external debt service to exports ratio decline to 15.6% indicates improved external debt sustainability. Statistical analysis confirms that the reserve recovery significantly outperformed regional emerging market averages during the same period, with Sri Lanka’s reserve-to-GDP ratio improving from 2.4% in 2022 to 7.1% in 2024.

The exchange rate stabilisation around LKR 299-324 per USD, following the crisis peak of LKR 361.8 per USD, contributed to inflation control and restored predictability for businesses and consumers. This currency stability was crucial for controlling imported inflation and enabling the resumption of normal economic activity.

5.2 Medium-Term Sustainability Challenges

Despite improvements across all indicators, medium-term sustainability faces several challenges. The debt-to-GDP ratio of 99.4%, while declining, remains above the 70% threshold typically considered sustainable for emerging economies. The IMF’s debt sustainability analysis projects that even with successful implementation of all reforms, sustainable debt levels will not be achieved until 2030-2032.

External vulnerabilities persist despite current account improvement. The economy’s narrow export base and continued dependence on volatile sectors such as tourism and remittances limit the sustainability of external balance improvements. The current account deficit of 0.8% of GDP, though manageable, indicates continued reliance on external financing for investment needs.

Exchange rate competitiveness gains from the crisis depreciation may erode over time if domestic inflation exceeds that of trading partners. Maintaining export competitiveness will require continued productivity improvements and structural reforms to enhance the business environment.

5.3 Comparison with Crisis Precedents

Argentina (2001-2005): Argentina’s recovery featured more aggressive debt restructuring but less disciplined fiscal policy. Argentina achieved faster debt ratio reduction through a 70% nominal haircut on external debt, compared to Sri Lanka’s more gradual approach prioritising creditor cooperation. However, Argentina’s primary fiscal balance remained volatile, while Sri Lanka has achieved more consistent fiscal improvement.

Greece (2010-2018): Greece’s adjustment featured sustained primary surpluses above 3% of GDP but required longer to achieve current account balance. Greece’s import cover ratio took six years to reach adequate levels, compared to Sri Lanka’s two-year recovery. However, Greece achieved more comprehensive structural reforms in public administration and labour markets.

The comparative analysis suggests that Sri Lanka’s balanced approach, emphasising both fiscal discipline and external sector adjustment, may offer advantages over more extreme adjustment strategies, though the ultimate test will be maintaining reform momentum over the medium term.

5.4 Statistical Significance and Robustness

Statistical testing confirms the significance of key improvements:

• Foreign exchange reserves: t-statistic = 4.73, p < 0.01
• Debt-to-GDP ratio reduction: t-statistic = 3.21, p < 0.05
• Primary fiscal balance improvement: t-statistic = 5.84, p < 0.01
• Current account adjustment: t-statistic = 2.97, p < 0.05

Regression analysis controlling for external factors (e.g., global commodity prices, regional growth and COVID-19 impact) suggests that up to about 70% of the observed improvements may be associated with EFF-related policy measures; these estimates are indicative and depend on model assumptions.

6. Conclusion

6.1 Summary of Findings

Post-EFF, Sri Lanka’s FX reserves rose (USD 1.9 → 6.12 billion) and debt/GDP eased (115.9% → 99.4%) in 2023–2024; however, deeper structural issues remain. The IMF’s Extended Fund Facility has provided crucial short-term relief to Sri Lanka, significantly boosting foreign exchange reserves and alleviating fiscal pressures. Statistical analysis confirms that improvements in both reserves and debt ratios are statistically significant and are unlikely to be random and are consistent with EFF-related policy measures. However, despite the country’s progress in reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio, the improvements are insufficient to resolve the deeper structural issues facing Sri Lanka’s economy. The persistent shortfalls in social spending targets highlight the need for more balanced adjustment strategies that protect vulnerable populations while achieving fiscal sustainability. The long-term sustainability of Sri Lanka’s debt burden remains critically dependent on the successful implementation of fiscal reforms and comprehensive debt restructuring. In the absence of these measures, the risk of returning to a debt crisis will remain elevated.

Updated analysis incorporating the latest IMF third review data confirms continued strong programme performance through early 2025 but also underscores the ongoing challenges in balancing fiscal consolidation with social development objectives.

6.2 Policy Recommendations

1. Maintain a Primary Fiscal Surplus: Sri Lanka should continue to pursue a primary fiscal surplus of at least 2.3% of GDP by 2025 and maintain it above 2% through 2030 to reduce its reliance on external borrowing. Establishing institutional frameworks for fiscal discipline is crucial to prevent a recurrence of unsustainable debt accumulation.

2. Accelerate Debt Restructuring: Comprehensive debt restructuring must be prioritised to establish clear repayment schedules and reduce the debt burden, ensuring more manageable fiscal conditions in the long term. Implementation of the bilateral creditor agreement should proceed according to the agreed timeline, with monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance.

3. Diversify Foreign Exchange Sources: The government should prioritise diversifying foreign exchange sources beyond tourism and remittances, focusing on export-driven growth and expanding service sectors including IT services (target: 25% growth annually), financial services and high-value manufacturing exports. Specific targets should include reducing dependence on any single sector to below 30% of total export earnings by 2027.

4. Promote Structural Reforms: Structural reforms in key areas such as tax collection, public expenditure management and improving the ease of doing business are critical to sustaining economic growth and improving long-term debt servicing capacity. Priority reforms include: (a) achieving a tax-to-GDP ratio of 15% by 2027; (b) completing the SOE privatisation programme by 2026; and (c) implementing comprehensive civil service reform.

5. Address Social Spending Shortfalls: Develop a comprehensive social protection strategy that balances fiscal consolidation with adequate social expenditure. Target social spending at minimum 2.5% of GDP, with specific allocations for healthcare (1.2% of GDP) and education (1.3% of GDP) by 2026.

6. Strengthen Institutional Frameworks: Establish independent fiscal institutions to monitor debt sustainability and ensure transparency in fiscal policy implementation. Create a sovereign wealth fund mechanism to manage windfall revenues and build fiscal buffers.

6.3 Future Research Directions

Future work may further probe the impact of the IMF’s conditionality on social spending and poverty alleviation in Sri Lanka, carefully observing how the demand for fiscal adjustment balances with overall social development objectives. Moreover, an in-depth and extensive analysis of debt restructuring options, their effectiveness and potential long-term implications for economic stability, and the implications for future IMF lending facilities might effectively aid in identifying the complex role of conditionality in the sustainable and long-term stabilisation of debt-stricken nations.

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