Abstract

Global climate diplomacy is commonly presented as a cooperative, science-driven enterprise, but its practice is shaped by profound structural and strategic power asymmetries. From the premium selectivity of scientific knowledge to the economic and political conditions attached to international aid and climate finance, this paper discusses the compatibility between climate policies, institutions and the diplomatic actions of powerful states with the adaptive and strategic manoeuvring of less powerful states. Case studies from small island states, Global South economies and postcolonial contexts illustrate how weaker nations are frequently placed in reactive positions. We offer special attention to the Paris Agreement, the politicisation of climate change discourse, and biases in access to climate-related finance and technology. Unless these epistemic, economic and diplomatic inequalities are addressed, global climate diplomacy will continue to reproduce global injustices even as it claims to promote collective action.

Introduction

Climate change may be the archetypal collective action problem of our era – and yet the global reaction is so far largely fractured and patchworked. The perception that global frameworks such as the Paris Agreement are committed to inclusive collaboration is merely that: perception. In reality, bigger and wealthier states still set the rules, priorities and timelines of global climate diplomacy.

In this paper, we discuss geopolitical and structural dynamics by which power in global climate diplomacy remains concentrated in the hands of a few countries at the expense of smaller, economically-burdened or historically-dominated countries. Through an intermingling of political theory, analysis of scientific research dynamics and case studies, we reveal the ways in which power imbalances emerge in and through scientific gatekeeping, funding pipelines, diplomatic pressure and policy mismatches. Drawing on a range of top-down international agreements and their material and epistemic consequences in the Global South, we question how climate diplomacy reproduces inequality on a global scale while purporting to embody consensus.

We begin in Section I with a discussion of the Paris Agreement, the prevailing framework of global climate diplomacy today. While the Agreement has fostered cooperation, transparency and broader engagement of both state and non-state actors, its lack of enforceable mechanisms has left global progress inconsistent, reflecting the tension between ambition and delivery, and demonstrating the broader challenges of addressing climate change as a collective action problem shaped by power asymmetries. We present the United States’ withdrawals from the Agreement under the Trump Administrations as symptomatic of these power asymmetries: one country has been able to upend unilaterally the global consensus reflected in the Paris Agreement. Appealing to realism and game theory, we suggest how the Trump Administration may have found a unilateral profitable deviation to leave the Agreement, especially if motivated by epistemological asymmetries in reporting emissions reductions.

In Section II, we pick up this theme to highlight how such epistemological asymmetries – gaps in trust, access and credibility of climate knowledge – shape the prospects for global climate diplomacy. State manipulation and climate change misinformation, especially via social media, undermine both domestic legitimacy and international cooperation, obstructing the collective response to climate change. Even research in climate change is skewed away from local, smaller solutions towards larger technological responses.

In Section III, we discuss how climate change exacerbates existing global inequalities, leaving developing countries – despite contributing least to emissions – disproportionately exposed to climate change. Wealthier countries, with greater financial and technological capacity, can better adapt and even continue benefitting economically from polluting industries, while vulnerable states face escalating costs, debt and limited access to climate finance or green technologies. Without reforms to climate aid, technology access and global governance, these asymmetries will deepen, turning climate change into not just an environmental crisis but a structural driver of injustice. These concerns should be at the forefront of global climate diplomacy.

Finally, in Section IV, we explore how strategic asymmetry shapes global climate cooperation. Powerful states set the rules and priorities of diplomacy while weaker nations are left to adapt, often at the expense of their own needs. Through case studies from small island states, major emitters and postcolonial contexts, we demonstrate how unequal influence perpetuates structural injustice in climate diplomacy.

i. The Paris Agreement: Between Promise and Power

Over the past fifty years, the global community has advanced a series of international agreements and conferences aimed at mitigating global warming and raising environmental awareness. Early successes included the First World Climate Conference (1979) and the Montreal Protocol (1987) on ozone protection. The creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 brought scientific consensus to the forefront, and the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 institutionalised global climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Later milestones, including the Kyoto Protocol (1997), aimed to formalise binding emissions targets.

The latest culmination is the Paris Agreement, a landmark international treaty on climate change, which was adopted by 196 parties at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris on 12th December 2015, and entered into force on 4th November 2016. The Paris Agreement set ambitious targets to prevent the global average temperature from increasing by more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while also pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2015).

Unlike its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol (1997), which had legally-binding emissions reduction targets that applied only to Annex I (developed) countries, the Paris Agreement introduced a universal and flexible framework built on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted by all parties. This design marked a deliberate shift away from top-down enforcement, allowing countries to tailor their commitments based on their individual capacities and priorities (Falkner, 2016).

The Paris Agreement emerged after decades of fragmented negotiations, with the failure of the Copenhagen Summit (COP15) in 2009 highlighting the need for a more inclusive approach to global climate policy (Falkner, 2016). For its part, at the time, COP21 was the largest meeting ever held for tackling climate change, heightening global awareness of climate change and attracting significant media attention. The Paris Agreement’s ‘pledge and review’ architecture, anchored by a five-year cycle of NDC updates, a Global Stocktake and the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), aims to continuously drive ambition and ensure accountability among the 196 parties, of which 195 have ultimately ratified the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015).

In this section, we highlight how the Paris Agreement has fostered cooperation, transparency and engagement in climate diplomacy, despite structural weaknesses in its lack of enforceable mechanisms. We discuss how the Trump Administrations’ withdrawals point to the persistence of power asymmetries in global climate diplomacy despite the consensus garnered in the Paris Agreement.

DIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENTS

The Paris Agreement is widely recognisED as a diplomatic triumph – not for its enforceability, but for its establishment of a common, global framework that legitimises climate action as a shared responsibility, perhaps especially in contrast to previous frameworks. The Paris Agreement consolidated a shift in international discourse from climate change being an obligation or burden on a few industrialised nations to a collective challenge requiring cooperation across borders, economies and sectors (Falkner, 2016).

Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement states (UNFCC, 2015):

This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

By embedding these principles, the Paris Agreement recognises both historical emissions and present inequalities. This diplomatic flexibility was crucial in integrating emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil, into the framework without alienating developed nations (Falkner, 2016).

Furthermore, the Agreement has become a catalyst for climate governance beyond the state. It has encouraged cities, businesses, financial institutions and civil society organisations to align with national and global targets, fostering what scholars refer to as a ‘polycentric’ approach to climate governance (Jordan et al., 2018). This pluralistic model strengthens resilience against diplomatic stalemates and elevates non-state actors as legitimate forces in global climate politics (Jordan et al., 2018).

CRITICISMS AND STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES

Among the criticisms levied against the Paris Agreement is the voluntary nature of the NDCs. Without legally-binding emissions targets or punitive enforcement mechanisms, countries are free to underdeliver or delay their commitments (Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). Recent assessments show that even if current NDCs were fully implemented, there would be an increase in global warming of approximately 2.5 to 2.9°C by 2100, far above the 1.5°C goal (Climate Action Tracker, 2024).

Additionally, loss and damage finance – a key demand from vulnerable nations – was not meaningfully addressed in the original Agreement, although progress has been made in recent COPs, such as the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27. The slow pace of climate finance delivery from developed to developing nations has also raised concerns over equity and good faith (Roberts & Weikmans, 2017).

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

The Paris Agreement has changed global climate diplomacy, fostering a culture of cooperation, transparency and continuous progress. It encourages countries not only to set their own climate goals, but also to collectively evaluate each other’s efforts, creating a ‘soft pressure’ and diplomatic accountability (Falkner, 2016; Jordan et al., 2018). Despite geopolitical tensions, such as the US’s withdrawal from the Agreement under the first Trump Administration, the Agreement has proven to be durable, adaptable and a powerful normative force (Falkner, 2016). It has established a crucial platform for ongoing dialogue, rooted (if implicitly) in principles like shared responsibility, procedural justice and long-term thinking (Jordan et al., 2018). Its impact extends beyond mere emissions targets, institutionalising climate diplomacy as a permanent and evolving aspect of international relations (Falkner, 2016).

Responses to the Paris Agreement have varied significantly. Some governments have used it as a catalyst for environmental progress, while others have fallen short of their self-imposed targets. For example, the United Kingdom, even while part of the EU, easily surpassed its 2020 target for emissions reduction, with its total output of warming gases decreasing by approximately 45% from 1990 levels. By contrast, current estimates indicate Australia will obtain an 18% reduction in its emissions compared to 2005 levels, far short of its target of a 26–28% reduction (cf. McGrath, 2021).

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATIONS’ WITHDRAWALS

The Trump Administrations’ decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement – both in 2020 during his first administration and expected in 2026 in his second administration – has sent ripples in global climate diplomacy and carries significant consequences. The decision signals a disregard for the urgency of climate change and a priority for other interests. In spite of the relief support provided, it may also question the federal government’s ownership of responsibility on the global stage for averting domestic major climate events, such as wildfires and floods.

The administration’s actions implicitly communicate that the world’s largest economy – and by extension, a significant portion of American society – does not feel an obligation to the rest of the world to reduce the US’s historically-significant carbon emissions. Whatever its justifications, the withdrawals undermine the principle of shared responsibility that underpins the Paris Agreement. Though it has not yet happened, it may encourage a ‘domino effect’ by which other countries follow suit, weakening global efforts to combat climate change. During the US’s first withdrawal, international climate diplomacy was disrupted and the US’s credibility on the world stage was damaged, sending a signal of unpredictability. It halted vital contributions to climate finance, impacting developing nations that rely on such support for mitigation and adaptation efforts.

In the absence of American leadership, other major players such as China, India and the European Union have increased their assertiveness in climate diplomacy. While subnational actors within the US such as cities, states and businesses have continued to pursue climate action, the federal withdrawals complicate international collaboration and risk hindering global progress towards the Paris Agreement’s targets. As we will discuss, the long-term effects on climate finance flows remain a significant concern for future COPs.

In short, the United States’ withdrawals from the Paris Agreement under the Trump Administrations exemplifies how powerful states can unilaterally destabilise global climate diplomacy, highlighting the fragility even of ‘inclusive’ frameworks like the Paris Agreement. Despite the Paris Agreement’s landmark reflection of shared responsibility, the ability of a single country to undermine its momentum exposes how power remains concentrated in a few major economies. Such a dynamic reinforces the perception that global cooperation is conditional on the interests of dominant actors, raising critical questions about whether climate diplomacy truly reflects consensus or instead perpetuates structural inequalities.

ROOTING IN THEORY

While it is easy to lament the Trump Administration’s withdrawals, it is worth highlighting how it may reflect a best-response strategy in global climate diplomacy.

Realism, one of the most influential theories in international relations, states that international relations operate in a state of anarchy, in which states rationally act in the global theatre to protect their self-interest and power – the currency of international relations. While classical realism emphasises the inevitability of conflict between states, neorealism and structural realism suggest that the potential for states to cooperate is limited by international structures, as arguably recognised in the weak enforcement of the Paris Agreement. Additionally, realism can help to elucidate how domestic pressure and political and economic instability shape states’ response to climate risks. Overall, realists adopt a sceptical approach to international frameworks like the Paris Agreement, reducing them to the instrumentality of states maintaining or acquiring power.

From another theoretical viewpoint, game theory reminds us that states’ decisions are contingent of those of other states, and a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma analysis can be applied to the US’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.

As cooperation under the Agreement is voluntary and there are no consequences for failing to meet targets, each state can choose whether or not to contribute to climate change mitigation. The cost of cooperation is a small reduction in GDP growth (OECD/UNDP, 2025), but the costs relative to other states are low if climate action is dispersed globally, as the Agreement proposes. Trump’s policy, even in trade and tariffs, suggests greater importance is afforded to ‘relative costs’ rather than ‘absolute costs’. Nonetheless, because the system relies on integrity and transparency from individual countries, states can falsify their reports (Mooney et al., 2021), breaking trust among the Agreement’s participants.

These assumptions can furnish an analytical explanation of why the Trump Administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement.  Especially facing the uncertainty of the extent to which other states had reduced their emissions, the Trump Administration perceived the high relative costs of staying in the Agreement and recognised a unilateral profitable deviation in leaving it. With all states facing the same game, the Nash equilibrium would be for states not to cooperate and thus withdraw from the Agreement.

Why have other states not withdrawn? Perhaps they face different payoffs, prioritising climate action or the long-term success of certain domestic industries, especially in the primary sector, which rely on stable environments like fishing and agriculture.

This analysis shows how lack of trust or transparency between decision-making actors can lead them to make decisions that will have negative implications for the climate and other actors – especially nations more vulnerable to climate change – to further their economics or power. In our next section, we continue to explore the importance of epistemology in global climate diplomacy in a wider context.

ii. Epistemological Asymmetries in Global Climate Diplomacy

As our preceding analysis has shown from a first principles approach, effective global climate action hinges on international data sharing, driven by values including transparency, equity and scientific integrity. Organisations such as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the Group on Earth Observations (GEO) emphasise the importance of this global exchange, which fosters the trust necessary for effective climate diplomacy. Nevertheless, data-sharing faces significant political and ethical hurdles. Sovereignty, security and economic interests complicate the sharing of national climate data, while ensuring equitable access, especially for the Global South, remains a significant concern (Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). Initiatives like the Paris Agreement’s ETF aim to address these concerns through standardised reporting and benefit-sharing.

Furthermore, trust is easily undermined when climate data becomes politicised. When countries distort or selectively present data to delay action or serve domestic agendas, they compromise the credibility of international cooperation and foster scepticism in global databases. This feeds into a ‘post-truth’ environment, where information is judged by its alignment with beliefs rather than its accuracy, hindering evidence-based solutions and paralysing coordination (Falkner, 2016).

In this section, we explore how epistemological asymmetries – unequal access to, control over and interpretation of climate knowledge – represent a critical fault line in global climate diplomacy. If effective cooperation depends on transparent and reliable data, structural imbalances, politicisation and deliberate manipulation create distrust that undermines collective action. We examine how state practices and information ecosystems distort climate knowledge, and we assess the consequences for public trust, multilateral negotiations and the legitimacy of international climate governance.

STATE MANIPULATION

The distortion of climate information by states, whether through intentional disinformation or unintentional misinformation, is a serious breach of democratic and diplomatic norms. Governments might cherry-pick data, dispute feasibility or employ ‘climate delay’ tactics that acknowledge climate change but resist urgent action.

Domestically, such strategies erode public trust in official information, pushing citizens towards unreliable sources and fostering conspiracy theories or apathy. Internationally, they undermine the trust vital for multilateral cooperation. Transparency mechanisms like the ETF depend on the perceived legitimacy of national contributions. A 2022 UK report found that less than half the public believed their government was genuinely motivated by future generations in climate policy, highlighting a credibility gap that weakens both domestic support and international partnership (Peritia, 2022). Ultimately, such manipulation violates accountability, eroding moral authority and hindering collective climate action.

Government intrusion into climate change discourse diminishes the authority of scientific institutions and the public expression of values that result in inaction. In the United States, federal government agencies were directed by the Trump Administration to downplay or reframe climate-related discoveries. For example, in 2017, the United States Environmental Protection Agency was directed to remove climate information from public websites (Volcovici, 2017); this camouflage obstructs the dissemination of risk and distorts public perception of the urgency of climate change.

Censorship is even more extreme in more authoritarian regimes; in some countries, citizens are banned from speaking out publicly about data that does not align with the government message. The effects are systemic: democratic deliberation is undermined, media narratives are warped and environmental planning for the long term is sacrificed to political expediency. This hierarchy of values, moulded and deepened by government messaging, leads to perennial underinvestment in community-based and social-resilience solutions. Influence policy, and indeed, perception itself, is how governments have an outsized effect on how societies prioritise climate threats, orchestrating society to collective action.

MISINFORMATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media plays a conflicting role in climate discussions. On the one hand, it empowers civic engagement, with movements like #FridaysForFuture mobilising millions by bypassing institutionalised vehicles for change. On the other hand, social media is a primary channel for misinformation, with algorithms creating echo chambers that limit diverse perspectives.

A study across eight countries in 2022 found that 25% of the public believed they saw false and misleading information about climate change on a weekly basis, including through channels other than social media (Ejaz et al., 2025). False narratives, whether ideological, profit-driven or state-sponsored, can outpace factual content, hindering informed decision-making and public support for policy. This challenge is acute in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, where mobile technology is a significant source of information, making communities vulnerable to manipulation.

Different platforms and media consumption habits also influence the spread of misinformation. 34% of Americans believe that renewable energy is more expensive than energy from fossil fuels, rising to 56% among regular Fox News consumers. Similarly, 29% of Britons believe that a significant number of scientists disagree on the causes of climate change, rising to 48% of regular Daily Mail consumers. The rise of TikTok globally also presents a new threat: TikTok users display higher rates of belief in climate change misinformation. Thus, while 20% of Australians believe that the energy crisis experienced in Europe is due to net zero and climate policies, 30% of TikTok users do. This suggests climate disinformation campaigns are often tailored to specific platforms and regional vulnerabilities, posing a significant barrier to a universally-informed global public that supports global climate diplomacy (CAAD, 2022).

TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM AND RESEARCH BIAS

Finally, the epistemology of climate change suffers from structural discriminations in policy design and research funding. Governments and major global organisations with large amounts of capital tend to focus on technological solutions requiring a ‘big pipeline’, such as carbon capture and storage. The ‘big pipeline’ approach stands in contrast to community-style options rooted in smaller technology bases and informed by social science. In a wider context, these political decisions follow a broader trend called ‘technological solutionism’, where professionalism in engineering takes precedence over naturalness or long-term equity (Morozov, 2013). Such favouritism is often shaped to suit corporate interests, funnelling climate financing into high-tech infrastructure. Much less is spent on fostering behavioural change, social resilience or local support systems.

Despite increasing evidence that community participation and changes in behaviour are part of the key package for dealing with climate change, Overland and Sovacool (2020) find that only 0.12% of climate research funding was attested to social science in a sample of 1,500 social science grants related to climate change. This shortcoming means that many strategies – including systems based on traditional knowledge from Indigenous peoples, local stewardship and mass organising – receive insufficient exploration and analysis, even if such approaches are inexpensive and proven to produce quick results. Meanwhile, diverse and active international organisations are restricted by their dependence on funds from more powerful constituents and influences.

Local adaptation networks, urban agriculture and renewable energy cooperatives are building resilience in ways that central governments and corporations fail to prioritise. These community-led solutions are vital, but still severely underfunded, and climate solutions often empower the poor while rarely offering direct financial benefits. There is little economic incentive to fund education programmes or decentralise energy access. Until the consequences of inaction begin to affect capital flows and elite security, the most powerful players will continue to outsource the crisis, postponing structural reforms while vulnerable populations absorb the damage. Without a deliberate shift in priorities, both financial and structural, global climate work risks being nothing more than a perpetuation of the very inequalities it claims to address.

SUMMARY

Epistemological asymmetries weaken the very foundations of global climate diplomacy: trust, accountability and shared commitment. When states manipulate climate knowledge or social media amplifies misinformation, public confidence erodes, evidence-based policymaking stalls and international cooperation suffers. Additionally, investment in climate research is skewed away from local, smaller solutions informed by social science. Overcoming these challenges requires not only technical mechanisms, but also a reinvestment in scientific integrity, media literacy and equitable data sharing. Closing epistemic gaps will empower states and societies to sustain the credibility and solidarity needed for informed global climate diplomacy and meaningful climate action.

iii. Structural Inequalities in the Economics of Climate Change

Climate change does not impact all countries equally. Instead, it amplifies pre-existing global inequalities, particularly between the Global North and Global South. Wealthier countries, which have historically been the largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, are often far better equipped to protect their populations from climate-related risks. Meanwhile, poorer countries – those that have contributed the least to global emissions – face the harshest consequences of a warming planet, including rising sea levels, extreme weather events and resource scarcity.

THE ASYMMETRIES OF CLIMATE RESILIENCE

Climate change is heralding an increased frequency of natural disasters and unusual weather patterns, which can profoundly affect a country’s industries, assets and overall economic growth as resources are diverted on adaptation and response to these events (Nguyen et al., 2025). Importantly, more developed nations are often less vulnerable to climate change and have more capital available to spend on adaptation and response. Conversely, developing countries are often unable to implement effective mitigation strategies due to low economic output, governance challenges and higher proportions of poverty (UK Parliament, 2022), creating unjustifiable opportunity costs for adaptive measures. Thus, developing countries are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change relative to developed countries.

This inequality means that polluting and emitting large quantities of CO2 is relatively far more financially beneficial for developed countries: the increase in economic growth is afforded by the country’s existing climate resilience, while developing countries are vulnerable to the effects of climate events. Therefore, despite larger economies contributing far more to rising global temperatures, developing countries are consistently incommensurately affected and lose out financially (C2ES, 2022). Without a technological solution or better global governance, economic climate injustice on the global stage will only accelerate.

Indeed, a clear correlation exists between economic status and climate vulnerability. Data from Oxfam (2023) reveals that the richest 10% of the global population are responsible for more than 50% of carbon emissions, whereas the poorest 50% contribute only around 7%. Despite their minimal roles in creating the crisis, countries such as Bangladesh, Mozambique and Kiribati are on the frontlines of climate impacts. As discussed, these countries often lack the financial and infrastructural capacity to implement adequate climate adaptation strategies, leaving their populations more exposed and less resilient.

This inequality also realises itself in an investment paradox. Developing countries are frequently urged to pursue sustainable development, reduce emissions and meet international climate goals, yet they often lack the financial infrastructure and international support to do so. Countries like Pakistan, which experienced devastating climate-induced flooding in 2022, are expected to rebuild sustainably despite overwhelming debt and minimal climate finance. Similarly, nations such as Malawi and Nepal must reconcile the demands of economic development with the high costs of climate mitigation, often without sufficient international assistance.

CLIMATE RISK AND TECHNOLOGICAL ACCESS

Moreover, global climate aid rarely corresponds to climate risk. Countries with some of the highest climate vulnerability scores, such as Haiti, Somalia and Chad, consistently receive less international climate financing than wealthier or more geopolitically strategic middle-income countries. International adaptation funding tends to prioritise countries with stronger trade ties or diplomatic importance over those most in need (Germanwatch, 2022). This results in a misallocation of resources that reinforces global inequalities and leaves the most affected populations without sufficient support.

Inequalities also manifest in the domain of technological access. Most renewable energy technologies, such as solar panels, battery storage systems and carbon capture technologies, are developed and patented by companies in the Global North. This monopoly over green innovation limits access for developing countries, who must often pay high licensing fees or rely on foreign aid to adopt these technologies. Such dependency not only stalls local innovation but also perpetuates a cycle of technological reliance that undermines national sovereignty and self-sufficiency in the Global South.

SUMMARY

Our discussion highlights how climate change is not merely an environmental crisis, but a structural one. It reinforces the global economic divide, placing an undue burden on nations that have contributed least to the problem. Unless global climate diplomacy addresses this inequality through better-aligned aid, accessible technologies and more equitable governance structures, the fight against climate change will remain unjust and incomplete. The very systems meant to solve the crisis may inadvertently deepen the economic vulnerabilities they aim to fix.

iv. Strategic Asymmetry and Its Applications

While global climate diplomacy is presented as a process where all voices are included and aligned, the real interactions between powerful and less powerful states suggest that power is distributed unequally. Large emitters and economic powers, most notably the United States and China, hold considerable sway over how international climate policies are written, where funding goes and which technologies become standard. In theory, multilateral frameworks such as the Paris Agreement give every country the space to participate equally and set their own goals. In practice, weaker states frequently find themselves adjusting to external demands instead of making decisions based on their own priorities, aligning with timelines and standards shaped by stronger states.

Strategic asymmetry arises where wealthier, larger states – such as the United States, China, and European powers – set the pace, rules and funding pipelines of global cooperation, leaving weaker states in reactive or dependent positions. This imbalance is visible in trade mechanisms, climate finance conditionalities and the dominance of technocratic forums that privilege Western languages and expertise. The Maldives, Algeria and many other vulnerable countries exemplify how exposure to climate risks intersects with structural dependence, while the US-China relationship demonstrates how the strategies of great powers shape global trajectories. This section examines how such unequal relationships are reproduced and reinforced in global climate diplomacy, and what they reveal about the fragility of ‘inclusive’ diplomacy.

THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC ASYMMETRY

The structural inequality in global climate diplomacy is especially visible when it comes to how climate funding and trade rules work. Countries in the Global South, often heavily dependent on outside aid or trade partnerships, have to manage a long list of conditions to access support. Western-backed tools like the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) can end up hurting countries that do not yet have the capacity to reduce emissions quickly, raising concerns that climate rules are being used more to protect advanced economies than to promote fairness. Similarly, China’s role as the world’s top exporter of green technologies, such as solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles, has created strong reliance on Chinese infrastructure in many regions of Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. Although these partnerships are helpful in expanding access to low-carbon solutions, they often make it harder for countries to choose their own systems or switch away from Chinese suppliers in the future.

Beyond these trade and technology issues, the very way international climate policy is set up tends to deepen these imbalances. Many weaker states face mounting pressure to revise their NDCs and meet global targets, not necessarily because it reflects urgent domestic priorities, but because they fear losing access to funding or being frozen out of diplomacy. This reaction can result in mismatched national plans that highlight high-profile emissions cuts while underfunding adaptation projects like flood control or food resilience. At the same time, global negotiations are conducted in technical formats and English-heavy environments, which makes it harder for less-resourced countries to engage fully. Traditional knowledge and local expertise often go unrecognised in these spaces, making it even harder for smaller voices to be heard.

Thus, the interaction between powerful and less powerful states in climate diplomacy reflects a mix of influence, dependency and subtle forms of pressure. While the language of equity and cooperation remains central to international climate efforts, the reality is that many Global South countries are often in a reactive position, adjusting their actions to meet outside expectations rather than building strategies grounded in their own environmental and social contexts. This imbalance weakens national autonomy and risks recreating the same global inequalities that climate diplomacy is meant to solve.

Indeed, in the Global South, strategies for environment and diplomacy are often shaped, if not constrained, by precedents and pressures from stronger nations. Sometimes this dynamic is both causal and correlative: when major powers postpone or dilute climate commitments, dependent countries often do so out of necessity or for political cover. For instance, in response to the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017, several Global South countries slowed their NDCs, citing a lack of leadership and reciprocity among the world’s biggest emitters (Forward Pathway, 2020). The perception that wealthy countries are not pulling their weight causes hesitation and doubt in diplomacy, weakening global cooperation.

Moreover, the climate strategies of many smaller states are contingent on the terms of international loans or aid packages, which are often shaped by more powerful countries’ economic interests rather than local priorities. For example, climate finance from the Global North is frequently used to fund large-scale infrastructure or carbon market mechanisms rather than adaptation strategies congruent within the local context. In some cases, this outside agenda-setting leads to policy mismatches: countries may invest in carbon trading systems or big renewable energy projects while shortchanging flood control or food security programmes critical for their populations. Furthermore, the dominance in global climate governance of English-speaking, technocratic forums sidelines non-Western environmental knowledge. This reduces smaller countries’ negotiating capacity in multilateral situations (American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2020). Consequently, these countries are usually reactive rather than proactive in climate diplomacy and adjust to match the priorities, timetables and cash flows of larger powers instead of their own environmental urgencies.

GLOBAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY IN THE MALDIVES

While experiencing the adverse effects of climate change firsthand, the Maldives is responsible for just 0.003% of global emissions (Muizzu, 2024). The country’s coral reefs – vital for beach formation, coastal protection and tourism – are deteriorating quickly: it is predicted that nearly all coral cover could vanish if global temperatures exceed 2°C (IFC, 2024). The Maldives is heavily dependent on tourism, and so without healthy coral reefs to attract tourists for activities such as snorkelling or diving, the economy is bound to suffer. With sea levels projected to rise by up to 0.9 metres by 2100, in the absence of effective adaptation, coastal flooding could damage a significant portion of the Maldives’ assets by costing possible billions in GDP during typical 10-year floods. Sea level rise poses an existential threat to the Maldives, with 80% of its land less than a metre above sea level and 40% of its population living within 100 metres of the coast (World Bank Group, 2024). Population centres including Malé and Hulhumalé are extremely low-lying and at risk of being submerged. Frequent flooding and submersion will exacerbate land scarcity, threaten life and harm the resorts that are vital for the Maldives’ tourism income.

Despite being such a small country on the global stage, the Maldives has been a proactive participant in global climate diplomacy. The country is a leading voice in UN climate talks through the alliance of small island states and the Group of 77. The Maldives has pushed for the operationalisation of the loss and damage fund and a global adaptation goal during COP negotiations (Corporate Maldives, 2025). To mitigate climate change impacts, it has initiated projects like Hulhumalé, a flood-resistant island. The Maldives ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016, committing to reduce emissions by 10% by 2030, and in 2020, with the WHO’s support, the Maldives developed its Health National Adaptation Plan under the Malé Declaration. The plan was made as a way forward to strengthen the climate resilience of health systems, integrate climate risk management, protect public health through a multisectoral approach, build workforce capacity, raise public awareness and secure sustainable financing to further protect both the economy and the people who are directly affected by climate change.

The Maldives’ vulnerability has positioned it as a key player in global climate diplomacy, where it advocates for urgent action while implementing measures to mitigate climate change within its own borders. Other small island nations such as Kiribati or Tuvalu are similarly affected by rising sea levels despite their limited contribution to climate change, again highlighting the structural inequalities in global climate diplomacy.

GLOBAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

China and the United States are two of the biggest actors on the global climate diplomatic stage. China is the largest global emitter of carbon dioxide: in 2021, coal still provided over 55% of its energy (IEA, 2021). At the same time, China has been viewed as a leader in renewable energy technologies, where it is the manufacturer of the most solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles in the world (IEA, 2022). China has committed to reaching a peak in its carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 (China State Council, 2020). However, there appears to be a sharp contrast between China’s climate commitments and efforts to continue its economic growth and energy security. The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–25) provided initiatives for energy efficiency and low-carbon development, but some critics assert the policies did little to reduce China’s reliance on fossil fuels (Li et al., 2021). Furthermore, following power shortages and blackouts in late 2021, when China increased its commitment to investing in coal with a clear focus on replenishing its reserves and alleviating electricity shortages, concerns were raised regarding the contradictions between its economic aspirations and climate policy (Zhang, 2022).

The United States, which has historically been a leading contributor of greenhouse gas emissions on average, has seen a decrease in emissions in the recent past due to a switch to renewable energy and reducing coal usage (EPA, 2022). Under President Joe Biden, the United States rejoined the Paris Agreement and even established a goal of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. The United States is also a leader in renewable energy innovation and research. Yet, domestic political divisions, particularly with opposing energy policies, are significant challenges to a cohesive climate agenda (Pew Research Center, 2021). Its inability to decarbonise quickly is due to states’ fossil fuel interests, especially in states such as Texas (Davenport, 2022).

Following both countries’ disproportionate contribution to global emissions, the climate policies of China and the United States muster an outsized impact on the possibilities for global climate action. The relationship between China and the United States therefore remains a key variable in determining the future of global climate diplomacy and the likelihood of a coordinated response to mitigate climate change. Although both countries have gone a long way in renewable energy, and have established ambitious emission reduction targets, they still face internal obstacles that prevent them from fully reconciling the pressure for economic growth with climate commitments. The contradictions that are found in China (such as its dependency on coal) and the political divisions found in the United States illustrate some of the challenges involved in making the shift to a low-carbon future.

POSTCOLONIAL GLOBAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY: ALGERIA AND FRANCE

Formerly colonised countries are some of the most vulnerable to climate change. Typically stripped of resources, they are left with little infrastructure to tackle resulting issues when colonial powers pull out (Pesa, 2024). A 2022 report found that climate vulnerability is higher in ‘locations with poverty, governance challenges and limited access to basic services and resources, violent conflict and high levels of climate-sensitive livelihoods, e.g. smallholder farmers, pastoralists, fishing communities’ (UK Parliament, 2022) – all factors often associated with postcolonial nations. This means that these countries suffer more when developed countries emit high levels of CO2, and are therefore more thoroughly impacted by any lack of action an industrialised country chooses to take regarding climate diplomacy. For this reason, former colonisers often pay reparations or give bilateral climate aid to these countries due to their culpability in their sensitivity to climate change, such as UK ICF contributions to Commonwealth countries or the Spanish ARAUCLIMA initiative designed to help Latin American countries facing the consequences of climate change. 

As of 2025, France gives no climate aid to Algeria. France does provide a yearly package of developmental aid, usually amounting to just under €150 million (Dupas, 2024), but none of this is designated for climate mitigation or adaptation, despite the substantial issues Algeria faces with climate disasters, especially wildfires. This is likely due to rocky political relations between the two countries due to disagreements on migration, but it leaves Algeria disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change. The country’s infrastructure designed to deal with wildfires is insufficient and counterintuitive (UNU EHS, 2025), which is partially due to France’s colonisation leaving Algeria with significant economic and systematic challenges. France’s impact on Algeria as a major global player, though indirect, is negative: both because it emits over double Algeria’s emissions, while providing no money or capital to help combat the repercussions, costing the country severely, and also because it had a role in making Algeria more vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters through its colonisation.

SUMMARY

Strategic asymmetry in climate diplomacy exposes the gap between the rhetoric of inclusivity and the reality of unequal influence. Wealthy states and major emitters dominate negotiations, finance and technology pipelines, leaving smaller and more vulnerable countries in reactive positions that compromise autonomy and adaptation needs. Our case studies of the Maldives, US-China relations and postcolonial dynamics between Algeria and France demonstrate how dependency, historical legacies and power politics continue to undermine equity in climate cooperation, perpetuating the very inequalities global climate diplomacy claims to resolve.

Conclusion

Global climate diplomacy faces challenges shaped not only by scientific urgency, but also by geopolitical, economic and historical inequalities. While the Paris Agreement delivers a global framework for combatting the alarming climate crisis, its effectiveness is constrained by flawed emission reporting and unequal national commitments. For all the rhetoric of inclusivity and shared responsibility, global climate diplomacy remains shaped by enduring asymmetries of power, knowledge and resources. Powerful players can still unilaterally destabilise international consensus; epistemological asymmetries undermine the credibility of knowledge on which cooperation depends; and structural inequalities in finance, resilience and technological access render the countries least responsible for emissions the most exposed to climate risks, which they are underfunded and undersupported to counter. Thus, while world leaders delay or deny, those who contribute the least to climate change suffer the most: low-income, rural and Global South communities face the worst consequences. The reluctance of many Global North actors could be explained through a realist perspective in which states act primarily out of self-interest.

Ultimately, for global climate diplomacy to achieve its purpose, it must evolve beyond a rhetorical strategy. Addressing climate change requires policies that restrict industrial output, limit fossil fuel dependence, regulate markets and hold corporate leaders accountable. Even major powers can walk away from rhetorics – indeed, Trump’s dismissal of a climate report with the phrase ‘I don’t believe it’ betrays not just ignorance but the availability of a political strategy to avoid climate obligations. Thus, a readjustment of global climate responsibilities, under the guidance of both economical and moral obligation, is essential to achieve a meaningful global reaction against the climate crisis. The crisis at the heart of global climate diplomacy is not merely environmental, but also political and structural.

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