Abstract

This research paper examines the paralysis of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body (AB) since 2019, caused by the United States’ blockage of new appointments. It addresses the U.S.’ rationale for blocking appointments, including concerns over judicial overreach and the temporary arbitrations, such as the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). The paper analyses the impact of this dysfunctional dispute settlement system on global trade governance, particularly through cases like the U.S. Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminium and the Boeing-Airbus WTO Subsidy dispute, which explores the adverse effects on other economies due to the appellate’s impasse. This paper’s findings illustrate the MPIA’s ineffectiveness, due to its limited scope of participation, excluding major economies like the USA and India. This paper concludes that the paralysis has led to numerous disputes remaining in permanent limbo, particularly affecting smaller economies such as Turkey, Guatemala and Honduras. It stresses the urgent need for reform to restore a functional and effective dispute settlement system that can uphold the fair practices once central to the WTO.

I. Introduction

The WTO Appellate Body – commonly referred to as the AB – is a standing body composed of seven members who hear appeals from reports issued by dispute settlement panels in trade conflicts brought by WTO members (WTO, n.d.). Established in 1995, its primary function is to provide an appellate review of legal interpretations and findings made by panels, with the authority to uphold, modify or reverse those findings (European Commission, n.d.). The WTO’s unique two-tier dispute settlement system consists of an initial adjudication by a panel of experts, followed by the right of either party to appeal the panel’s findings to the Appellate Body. This structure provides both a thorough first-instance examination and an opportunity for legal review, enhancing the credibility, fairness and predictability of global trade governance by allowing disputes to be resolved through objective, law-based processes rather than through political or economic pressure. As the highest adjudicative authority in the WTO dispute settlement system, the AB ensures that the interpretation of WTO agreements remains consistent and authoritative, thereby upholding the rule-based international trading system. The body operates with a mandate to resolve disputes expeditiously, adhering to strict timelines (WTO, n.d.) and plays a crucial role in maintaining predictability and fairness in global trade relations. Its members are appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and serve four-year terms, renewable once with each term being staggered so the body remains functional with continuity (WTO, n.d.).

The U.S. began blocking new appointments to the Appellate Body in 2017 and rejected all proposals to occupy vacant seats (Horton & Hopewell, 2021). This strategy aimed to prevent its functionality, ultimately leading to its eventual paralysis in 2019. By 10 December 2019, there were too few judges for the dispute settlement system to operate (Hillman, 2020). This was caused by multiple factors, including U.S. concerns about the AB’s judicial overreach, unauthorised extensions of members’ terms, the use of binding precedent and the scope of the AB’s mandate (Hillman, 2020).

Therefore, this paper contends that the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body has significantly weakened the integrity and effectiveness of the global dispute settlement system; although the creation of the MPIA has offered a partial and temporary solution, persistent structural limitations and the exclusion of major trading powers have left important trade disputes mostly unresolved and undermined the predictability of the multilateral trading order. The paper does this by beginning with the context behind the WTO Appellate Body, including its institutional mandate and importance within the WTO’s two-tier dispute settlement framework. Expanding on this, the paper then looks at the U.S. justification for preventing appointments to the Appellate Body, tackling the various issues raised by the United States, such as claims of court overreach, violations of procedural standards such as unapproved term extensions and the deliberate effort to protect domestic economic interests. The subsequent section explores the creation and operational modalities of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as a provisional mechanism designed to circumvent the paralysis of the Appellate Body. Finally, the research ends by assessing current reform initiatives and contemplating potential future paths for reestablishing the legitimacy, inclusivity and authority of the WTO dispute settlement system. This analysis proceeds in three parts: (i) it maps how the Appellate Body (AB) paralysis has affected enforcement since 2019; (ii) it evaluates the scope and limits of Article 25/MPIA arbitration as an interim fix; and (iii) it weighs pragmatic reform pathways and their political feasibility. This paper asks what the 2019 paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body has meant for enforcement of trade rules and what credible progress, if any, has been made toward restoring a two-tier system.

I.I U.S. Rationale

The nature of trade protectionism implies that countries will act in their own best interest to achieve economic objectives. A key objective for the U.S. was the protection of domestic industries against unfair trade practices, which it pursued through antidumping and countervailing duties (Bown, 2019). In response, WTO members such as Canada and the EU challenged its promulgated measures, arguing that they violated the WTO rules (WTO, 2019). Since 1995, 42 formal disputes have been raised against U.S. trade remedy measures, accounting for more than half of all disputes in 2017 (Steward & Drake, 2017).

Further fuelling U.S. frustration, some AB members have remained in office beyond their term in office, breaching WTO rules. The U.S. argued that WTO members should have a say in such extensions, instead of AB members going over their jurisdiction (Hillman, 2020). Furthermore, issues with binding precedent have also become increasingly prevalent: the AB emphasised previous rulings in certain disputes, despite WTO rules requiring each dispute to be considered separately. Lastly, while the AB’s mandate is strictly limited to reviewing legal issues and ensuring the correct application of WTO rules, in some instances it went further by overturning factual findings from dispute panels, thereby exceeding its role as a legal reviewer. Ultimately, all of these factors have contributed to the U.S.’ persistent disagreement with the AB and the eventual paralysis of the dispute settlement system.

I.II The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA)

The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) directly addresses the crisis caused by the United States’ blockage of appointments to the WTO Appellate Body. The MPIA is a temporary alternative mechanism established by a group of 16 WTO members in March 2020 to address the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body caused by the U.S. blocking judge appointments (Geneva Trade Platform, n.d.). The MPIA operates under Article 25 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which permits arbitration as an alternative means of dispute settlement when the Appellate Body is unable to hear appeals (Pauwelyn, 2023). One advantage of the MPIA is that its procedures and regulations are less cumbersome than those of the AB. Compared to AB reports, its reports are far more succinct and are released on schedule. Furthermore, the WTO Secretariat’s comparatively lax handling of MPIA matters is another noteworthy distinction: none of the “guidance” that the AB Secretariat had previously offered is present (Rockwell, 2025). It has already handled several appeals, including disputes over intellectual property, Colombia’s concerns about anti-dumping duties on frozen fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, and pharmaceuticals between participating members (Geneva Trade Platform, n.d.).

However, while the MPIA preserves a degree of legal certainty for the WTO and continuity for its participants, several limitations remain. Major economies like the U.S. and India have not joined, and participation is voluntary and case-by-case (McBride & Siripurapu, 2022), limiting the universality and binding force of its decisions. As such, the MPIA is widely regarded as a more temporary measure that cannot fully resolve the core crisis of the U.S.’ blockage of appointments, especially as the U.S. continues to oppose reforms proposed by other members, showing little commitment to restoring a two-tier binding dispute resolution system at the WTO.

II. Analytical lenses and evidence

We show how “appeal into the void” weakens the bite of panel reports by mapping post-2019 dispute routes and outcomes. However, until today MPIA is far from an effective solution. This is because participation is limited, where it excludes major members such as the United States, India and Russia, and it has been used in only a small number of disputes. Furthermore, the WTO’s wide reform efforts through the “Walker Process” have failed to produce a general agreement over the past few years. Proposals to clarify the scope of appellate review, reduce delays and address concerns over precedent were ultimately rejected by the United States, leaving the MPIA as a partial workaround rather than a systemic and effective replacement (Brill, 2023). This illustrates how efforts to restore full functionality to the system have been stalled, leaving the MPIA as a temporary substitute.

We explain what the MPIA changes in practice (coverage, consent and scope), contrasting it with ordinary panel proceedings, and we flag its limits (membership, opt-in nature and subject-matter gaps) that keep some disputes in bilateral limbo. Smaller and developing economies are being affected the most since they need to rely on impartial adjudication to safeguard their trade rights against larger and more powerful economies. For example, India and Turkey both challenged U.S. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium, but their cases have been left unresolved in the appeals process. Countries in Latin America and Central America have also been affected a lot, where due to the lack of a fair arbitration body, they are facing greater vulnerability. In addition, developed countries have also been impacted, where the European Union, Canada and Brazil, all members of the MPIA, continue to pursue disputes through arbitration. However, the rulings of the MPIA do not have the same universal enforceability as those of the Appellate Body, because not all WTO members are part of this arrangement. Therefore, this further proves the ongoing fragmentation of the system.

We assess near-term procedural fixes (clearer timelines and narrow national-security guardrails), medium-term defaults (opt-in appeal arbitration) and the longer-term path back to a two-tier system using three criteria: enforceability, inclusiveness and political feasibility. On that basis, we argue for targeted fixes now while leaving the door open to a restored AB when politics allow; for example, the U.S. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium, contested by India, China, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, remain unresolved, leaving global trade in metals still uncertain. The inability to resolve these cases highlights how critical trade remedies are to the integrity of the system (CIGI, 2020). Beyond U.S. measures, there are also disputes involving the European Union’s agricultural subsidies, where they are challenged by Brazil and Argentina. Similarly, the United States and other nations have challenged China’s industrial subsidies. With these major disputes still unresolved, uncertainty over the global markets continues to perpetuate.

III. Methods

Our methods include desk-based comparative review (2019–2025) of WTO documents, academic/think-tank briefs and official press releases. We compile reported figures (MPIA members, appeals and case status) and triangulate where possible. No interviews or econometrics were undertaken.

IV. Results

To truly grasp the implications of the blockage of appointments to the AB, and what progress has ultimately been made towards reforming the dispute settlement system, it is essential to look into two main elements: (1) what compensatory measures the WTO has adopted following the collapse of the AB (by investigating the effectiveness of the recently-instituted MPIA); and (2) the effects it bore on WTO members (by analysing disputes which took place following 2019 and how it influenced their economies).

Firstly, the paralysis of the AB was quickly dealt with by the WTO through the creation of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), an interim substitute of the Appellate Body, on the 30 April 2020 (Geneva Trade Platform, 2025). While temporarily set in place in an attempt to address the decisional gap created by the paralysis of the AB, it does hold importance in past and ongoing disputes. For example, it successfully finalised the dispute originated from the Colombian dumping duties on frozen fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, receiving the MPIA award on 21 December 2022 (Geneva Trade Platform, 2025), two and a half years after its creation.

However, this case, alongside the dispute between the EU and China concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights released in July 2025, were the only ones the MPIA has settled in the past four years (World Trade Organization, 2025; European Parliament, 2024). This inefficiency is mainly due to a lack of members: as of 2025, there are currently 57 members in the organisation, with the newest entry being the U.K., having joined on 26 June 2025 (World Trade Law, 2025). This constitutes 34% of the WTO, lacking economic superpowers such as the U.S., India and Russia. This is problematic once it’s noted that the MPIA relies on reciprocal collaboration between disputing parties. If a party is not part of the organisation, an appeal cannot proceed through the arrangement (Aceris Law, 2025). As such, WTO members have resorted, much less than before 2020, to litigation under the WTO dispute settlement system, greatly reducing its case load. They have either appealed cases into the “legal void” or have resorted to independent arbitration or mutual agreements outside of the WTO to reach a solution (European Parliament, 2024). As such, the MPIA is not as effective as the Appellate Body, as it lacks a considerable number of members from the WTO, causing the organisation to be less reputable as appeals often go into legal limbo, undermining its ultimate effectiveness.

The blockage of appointments to the WTO Appellate Body in 2019 has also led to many quantifiable effects on multiple global economies. By paralysing the appointments to the Appellate Body, which significantly hindered the dispute settlement system’s inherent duty to enforce global trade rules, WTO members were essentially left to break rules and accords without suffering any sort of consequence, harming other economies in the process. This is due to the MPIA arbitration accord, which must be strictly held between two members from the organisation. One notable example is the United States’ imposition of additional duties on steel and aluminium in 2018. Countries such as China and Turkey promptly retaliated by imposing duties on a handful of U.S. products, and challenged these measures at the WTO, arguing that Washington was abusing Article XIX from the GATT (CSIS, 2023). This is due to Washington labelling their policy as a “safeguard measure”, a measure put in place to protect local industries from the excess import of specific foreign goods. The U.S. appealed every report and, following the shutdown of the AB, essentially went into the legal void. However, this precedent set an example which was promptly followed by other countries, notably China, whose industrial subsidies’ reports remain unsolved. This back-and-forth between the two superpowers will only mean that the duties levied against each other will remain, harming both countries’ industries (CSIS, 2023).

V. Discussion

V.I Impact on Latin America and Central America

The paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body has been especially damaging for developing countries, where they depend more heavily on a functioning dispute settlement system to secure fair treatment in the global trading system. Unlike developed economies that have the diplomatic clout and economic leverage to negotiate settlements bilaterally, smaller, and poorer states rely on binding rulings from the WTO to enforce trade rights. Therefore, the absence of an appellate mechanism has stripped them of this safeguard, leaving them increasingly vulnerable to the policies of larger economies.

For example, the Latin American and Central American countries have experienced a more direct consequence. Guatemala and Honduras, for instance, have brought disputes concerning agricultural exports and anti-dumping measures. These sectors are central to their economies, yet the paralysis of the Appellate Body means their cases remain unresolved. There are statistics that show between 1995 and 2014, Latin American and Caribbean countries initiated 117 WTO dispute settlement cases as complainants and were respondents in another 93 cases, accounting for 24% and 19% respectively of all such cases globally. This participation far exceeds the region’s share of world merchandise trade by 5.5% during the same period (ECLAC, 2015). This highlights how much Latin American countries relied on the WTO safeguards to maintain bargaining power and fair trade around the world. However, the paralysis has therefore entrenched structural inequalities, where small states cannot rely on the multilateral system to protect their vital export interests.

V.II U.S.’ Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminium

The dispute over the United States’ Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium clearly shows how the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body has undermined the enforceability of international trade law. These tariffs were first imposed in March 2018 under the Trump administration, and they are justified by Washington as necessary for national security under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The measures included a 25% tariff on steel imports and a 10% tariff on aluminium. It is applied broadly to almost all trading partners, with limited exemptions (Bown, 2019). While the United States claimed these tariffs were imposed for national security concerns, most WTO members viewed them as protectionist instruments designed to protect their domestic industries.

After the imposition, numerous WTO members including the European Union, China, India, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Canada challenged the tariffs. They argued that the Section 232 measures were disguised safeguard actions that violated WTO obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, particularly Articles I (WTO members to treat all trading partners equally), II (members not to impose tariffs above the bound rates they agreed when joint the WTO) and XI (prohibits quotas, bans or restrictions other than tariffs) (WTO, 2018a). They also claimed that the United States had misused Article XXI, the GATT’s national security exception, which was originally intended for exceptional situations such as war or armed conflict, rather than an economic competition in a civilian market (Ruiz, 2020). The United States countered the imposition by saying the Article XXI grants the members the decision and freedom in determining what constitutes an essential security interest for them; yet in Washington’s views, it claimed that the AB and panels had no authority to second-guess its invocation of “national security” (USTR, 2019). With this said, it marked a sharp break with the U.S.’ cooperation with the WTO system and foreshadowed their block to new AB appointments.

The consequences of this action have substantially impacted the other members. As the EU is heavily reliant on integrated steel supply chains – the European Commission estimated that U.S. steel and aluminium tariffs caused the EU nearly 28 billion euros in export losses (European Commission, 2019) – it decided to retaliate with tariffs on U.S. goods such as motorcycles and bourbon whiskey. In addition, India and Turkey, both major exporters of steel to the U.S., faced significant losses and argued that the tariffs undermined their market access and hurt their industrial base.

This case reveals the systemic risks of an incapacitated dispute settlement system, where without an operational AB, the WTO cannot constrain the unilateral actions justified under the vague reason of “national security”. This creates a dangerous image to others that if the U.S. can shield its industrial tariffs under Article XXI without review, other members may also copy the caution in sectors like food security, energy or digital trade (Ruiz, 2020). For example, Russia has invoked national security in disputes related to trade restrictions against Ukraine. This strategy has bypassed the WTO framework, where it erodes the centrality of the organisation and pushes its members back towards a power-based system to trade relations.

The Section 232 disputes taught that for future WTO reforms, the scope of Article XXI should be clarified, as it’s important to establish clearer guardrails to prevent misuse of the national security as a cover for protectionism (Charnovitz, 2019). Second, the disputes show the dangers of leaving the appellate tier non-functional, where the ability to “appeal into a void” incentivises the larger powers to disregard the rulings, causing large amounts of side effects to the global economy.

V.III Boeing-Airbus WTO Subsidy Dispute

The Boeing-Airbus WTO subsidy dispute refers to a series of ongoing disputes between the United States and the European Union regarding alleged subsidies provided to the aerospace manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus (Airbus, 2021) – many of which challenged the component of fair competition and how these companies have breached the international rules under the WTO.

The key disputes include:

DS316: European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft;
DS353: United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft – Second Complaint;
EU’s Appeal of the 2018 WTO Compliance Panel Report on the Airbus A350 Loan Agreement.

DS316 was launched by the U.S. in 2004, accusing the EU and Airbus of receiving illegal subsidies such as “launch aid” and the provision of other financial support to Airbus (World Trade Organization, 2009). The Appellate Body rulings found these subsidies deviating from the WTO rules, and have thus directed the EU to withdraw them. Furthermore, DS353, initiated by the EU in 2005 against the U.S. and Boeing, advocated that state subsidies including tax breaks and R&D funding pursued unfair trade practices, and thus were found incongruent with WTO rules and the AB authorised retaliatory tariffs (World Trade Organization, 2020). Subsequently, in December 2019, the WTO compliance panel found that the moderations Airbus imposed on the French and Spanish Repayable Launch Investment (RLI) on the A350 were not in conformity with market conditions, and thus viewed as a breach of WTO rules (Airbus, 2021). The EU’s disagreement with this finding prompted them to file an appeal to the WTO’s AB. However, since the U.S. has been blocking appointments to the AB judges, the appeal cannot proceed, and the dispute settlement is in a permanent limbo known as “appeal into the void”.

The consequences of an ineffective dispute settlement system are evident in cases of such legal limbos. Over billions of authorised tariffs by both sides remain in dispute without resolution due to the appellate’s impasse: the EU are unable to obtain WTO confirmation of compliance on disputes of the A350, while the U.S. continues to possess the ability to impose countermeasures like tariffs on EU goods, exacerbating the trade war between the two member states (Airbus, 2021). The paralysis of a functional AB instigated bilateral settlement between both members, as opposed to the multilateral process the AB would carry out. As a result, in 2021, a truce was made, effectively suspending tariffs on $11.5 billion of goods for five years and preventing escalating trade tensions (Leggett, 2021). The erosion of AB adjudication instilled an environment conducive for negotiation outcomes in favour of the U.S., contrary to the fair trade principles associated with the WTO. This event serves as a prominent example of how a dysfunctional appellate mechanism can threaten long-term dispute resolution, as future rulings could be overlooked rather than legally enforced. This stresses the urgent need for reform to restore discipline within the international economy.

Additionally, countries subjected to unfavourable panel decisions in regard to industrial subsidies, for example China, may resist compliance with such systems, as the Boeing-Airbus WTO subsidy dispute acts as precedent for the strategical manipulation of the AB’s impasse to their advantage (高瞻, 2025). This has arguably created unforgiving challenges for dispute settlement systems and demonstrated the obsolescence of regulation and enforcement on the global stage, representing a regression in compliance with fair trade practices.

V.IV Reducing Transaction Costs and Clarifying Mandates to Strengthen WTO Dispute Settlement

The interim arrangement serves as a temporary replacement for the AB and could prove unsustainable in the long term, given the adverse effects of current trade policies. To strengthen the effectiveness of the MPIA, it is important to acknowledge the main factors that initially caused the paralysis of the AB. These include the complex and unpredictable nature of the DSS – namely, long appeals and problems with binding precedent that undermine the effectiveness of its rulings – as well as uncertainties regarding the AB’s mandate, specifically its role as a legal body rather than a quasi-judicial one. All of these factors incur high transaction costs, particularly negotiation and enforcement costs, which is contradictory to the supposed role of institutions according to Coase’s theory of transaction costs (Godłów-Legiędź, 2009). When countries face overwhelming transaction costs, they may find unilateral retaliation more attractive, as it is state-controlled and may appear to be a “viable” alternative to the DSS for achieving economic objectives. However this violates WTO rules according to Article 23 and may prompt a retaliatory cycle (World Trade Organization, 2024).

Thus, targeting procedural clarity to reduce these transaction costs could significantly reduce the complexity of its appeal system and facilitate greater cooperation among members. Furthermore, to reduce uncertainty around the AB’s mandate and the unpredictability of rulings, stricter and clearer WTO rules must be imposed to ensure adherence and unity. Handling each dispute separately, without reliance on binding precedent, and limiting the DSS to its role as a legal body, without interfering in factual evidence, could generate substantial improvements in member cooperation. Moreover, to address procedural complexity, the WTO could implement much shorter timelines for decision-making, thereby reducing bargaining and negotiating costs. In accordance with earlier GATT disputes, where 31% of 207 disputes were concluded through pre-ruling settlements – that is, disputes handled before reaching the panel rulings (Hudec, 1993) – such practices could limit the risk of unilateralism.

VI. Conclusion

The paralysis of the WTO’s Appellate Body since 2019 has left a lasting mark on the credibility of the multilateral trading system. By blocking appointments, the United States effectively dismantled the final stage of dispute settlement, creating a legal vacuum where countries can appeal cases into the void and avoid compliance. This has not only undermined trust in the WTO’s ability to enforce its own rules but has also shifted the balance of power toward larger economies that can rely on political or economic strength to settle disputes. Developing countries, in particular, have been left vulnerable, as they depend more heavily on the certainty and protection that a rules-based system provides.

Attempts at workarounds, such as the EU-led Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration (MPIA), have shown that members are willing to innovate, but the initiative is limited in scope and participation. Similarly, ongoing discussions – ranging from the 2019 “Walker Process” to the 2022 and 2024 ministerial commitments – signal recognition that reform is essential. Proposals to clarify appellate procedures, shorten timelines and define the role of precedent suggest a way forward, yet the pace of reform remains slow and fragmented. Much of this stems from the U.S.’ insistence on curbing what it views as judicial overreach, a position that continues to stall meaningful consensus.

Ultimately, the current situation is both a challenge and an opportunity. On one hand, the credibility of the WTO is at risk: without an effective dispute settlement mechanism, the organisation’s core function (ensuring predictable and enforceable global trade rules) remains compromised. On the other hand, this crisis has forced members to confront weaknesses that may have been ignored in times of stability, creating an opening for reforms that could make the system more transparent, efficient and widely respected. Whether the WTO emerges stronger or weaker will depend largely on whether members, especially the United States, can bridge their differences. This crisis, while disruptive, could yet mark the beginning of a stronger, more credible WTO dispute settlement system if members choose reform over gridlock.

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What are the implications of the United States’ blockage of appointments to the WTO Appellate Body in 2019, and what progress has been made towards reforming the dispute settlement system?