Abstract

This paper argues that the gravest crisis facing international law lies not in State defiance but in the very institutions entrusted with upholding it. It first examines the use-of-force regime under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, contending that the International Court of Justice’s refusal in Nicaragua to define “armed attack” or resolve anticipatory self-defence has left States operating in ambiguity, exploited through NATO’s Kosovo intervention and its post-9/11 invocation of Article 5. Yugoslavia v Spain illustrates how consent-based jurisdiction further shields powerful States. It then traces Security Council paralysis across Syria, Ukraine and Gaza, where P5 vetoes and routine disregard of the obligatory abstention rule in Article 27(3) have rendered the Council powerless precisely when intervention is most urgent. Finally, it assesses the G4 and Uniting for Consensus reform proposals, concluding that Article 108 and P5 self-interest have frozen meaningful restructuring for the foreseeable future.

Introduction

After World War Two, the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were founded. Created to promote international peace and prevent conflict, the UN produced a Charter that outlined its goals and laws, as well as the Security Council’s role. The Security Council comprises five permanent members (Russia, China, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France) who hold veto power, as well as ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly every two years. Veto power enables each of the States to block a resolution, regardless of the other members’ opinions or votes.

In recent years, the Security Council has faced problematic situations, with the P5 using their veto powers on global issues that might affect them or their allies. The UN Charter has also caused issues, from conflicts such as Kosovo to Syria; international disputes have forced us to question the effectiveness of this law. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision to broaden the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4), while avoiding defining the boundaries of its principal exception of self-defence, has left States with little clarity on how international law should govern crises. The power to authorise enforcement of the prohibition rests with the Security Council – an organ whose structural weaknesses leave implementation dependent on superficial factors like political will rather than on legal duties. Together, these failures suggest that international law’s greatest crisis may not be defiance, but the very structures entrusted to sustain it.

Use of Force and the UN Charter

The Security Council

According to the United Nations, the Security Council’s role is to maintain international peace and security. The Council examines situations on a case-by-case basis and decides when to deploy peacekeeping troops worldwide. Chapters V to VIII of the UN Charter set out the Security Council’s explicit powers, the parties involved, the procedures to follow and regional oversight for States. Japan and Argentina have both held seats multiple times, but 58 countries have never served on the UN Security Council (UN Website, Security Council, n.d.). In recent years, Russia and the United States have used veto power to block aid to Ukraine and a ceasefire deal with Israel and Gaza, respectively (Knell, 2025). Many members of the UN have argued that they view the Security Council’s veto system as “anachronistic,” while also stating that “it [is] incompatible with the UN’s role as a genuinely global institution” (Channer, 2026). When permanent States involved in the issue the Security Council is voting on can veto aid or support to others, it can and will make the UN a body with no practical function. 

Self-Defence

Under the UN Charter, Article 51 provides that the right to self-defence, both individual and collective, may be exercised only when “an armed attack occurs”. The framework treats self-defence as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) – a cardinal principle of international law. On paper, the provision is unequivocal about the lawful use of force beyond borders. However, in practice, the particulars of the exception become blurred, creating legal uncertainty for States. 

The International Court of Justice has consistently held that an “armed attack” is a substantially higher threshold than a “use of force” (Santos, 2026). This is best illustrated by Nicaragua v United States [1986]: the Court ruled that an armed attack involves the direct sending of armed forces by a State or “substantial involvement” by commanding any paramilitary groups to carry out violence similar to a full-scale military attack, including invasion, occupation and bombardment. The United States had played a pivotal role in the activities of the militants, who were actively engaged in conflict with the Nicaraguan government, through funding, training and instructing attacks (International Court of Justice, 1986). Although the Court agreed that its contributions were “preponderant or decisive”, the attacks were insufficient to qualify as “armed attacks” because they could not be attributed to the U.S. (Boyle, 1987). This made clear that not every illegitimate use of force can be met with force. This very lack of clarity between mere aggressive attacks and those that can be met with a lawful defensive response has forced States to operate in ambiguity.

Another matter Nicaragua raised but failed to address is anticipatory self-defence. Also referred to as pre-emptive self-defence, the term concerns the legality of a State striking another in response to an attack that has not yet materialised but is imminent. The Court here avoided answering the question on the grounds that it was irrelevant to the dispute before it – a decision which has sparked further debate (Bokhari & Mehta, 2026). The obscurity surrounding an issue as contested as this persisted decades later in the Armed Activities case, where the Court again avoided the question (International Court of Justice, 2005).

However, perhaps the Court’s decision to avoid answering these questions is intentional, a matter of prudence rather than failure. Settling on a fixed, rigid definition of an “armed attack” or untangling anticipatory self-defence risks creating a rule that is too narrow, or worse, too broad. Such an approach may leave States helpless in the face of threats or legitimise the use of force too easily, provoking further conflict. Thus, one should appreciate the ICJ’s case-by-case system for preserving flexibility. Nonetheless, this flexibility comes at a cost. In situations where States have no choice but to make unilateral judgement calls about the use of force, the Charter’s provisions are automatically undermined. Overall, the interpretation of “self-defence” is subjective, leading to inconsistencies and deviations from the Charter and further weakening the credibility of the international legal system.

This uncertainty is exemplified by collective defence treaties that invoke Article 51 to justify military action. NATO has already adopted Article 5, which states that in the event of an “armed attack” on any member State, the Parties will make all the necessary efforts to meet the emergency. However, in the past, such calls for assistance have expanded the boundaries of what NATO recognises as an “armed attack”. The 1998 war in Kosovo, although not involving Article 5, raises basic questions about whether the Charter’s restrictions apply when powerful alliances launch unilateral interventions without Security Council authorisation, let alone in the absence of an armed attack on a member State (Miller, 1999). Following the 9/11 attacks, the use of Article 5 was intended to widen the scope of collective self-defence to cover armed attacks by a non-State actor (Al-Qaeda), in direct opposition to the ICJ’s reliance on Nicaragua, in which it had insisted that armed attacks were to be traced to a State (Robertson, 2001). These examples show how the Charter’s limitations are being bypassed and overcome in the name of political commitment to legitimate and illegal orders. They have also entrenched the practice of Article 51 and helped challenge the use-of-force regime, contributing to a crisis of international law’s legitimacy.

Yugoslavia v Spain is a clear example of how the UN and the ICJ have encountered major obstacles in the wording and framing of certain articles. Yugoslavia filed proceedings against Spain and nine other NATO countries, but the ICJ dismissed the case against Spain for “manifest lack of jurisdiction”, meaning it could not pursue the case. In the filings against the other countries, the ICJ stated that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction, meaning it found no obvious basis to proceed with the cases (International Court of Justice, n.d.). Yugoslavia relied on Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, but the other States argued that the aid sought had no relation to the Genocide Convention. The Court also found that “the threat or use of force against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as the intended destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such” (American Society of International Law, 1999).

Additionally, in its filings against France, Germany, Italy and the United States, Yugoslavia invoked Article 38(5) of the ICJ Rules of Court. According to Article 38(5), “when a State files an application against another State that has not accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the application is transmitted to the State named as the respondent, but no action is taken in the proceedings unless and until that State has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case” (American Society of International Law, 1999). This means that unless the State accepts the ICJ’s jurisdiction for the case, the ICJ cannot proceed, as it lacks any real power over the State. None of the States mentioned above were willing to allow the ICJ to gain jurisdiction at the time of filing, so the ICJ had to dismiss the cases against those States. 

In the end, the only outcome was an ICJ warning to all States involved to cease further action in the Kosovo war. This case clearly shows how loose rules around international law have prevented States from pursuing cases and how certain laws are ineffective. Because the ICJ must obtain State consent to gain jurisdiction, it means that in certain situations, such as a major war or genocide, the ICJ could be blocked from proceeding with filings against those States.

One may argue that claiming international law is in crisis implicitly makes an unfair comparison with domestic legal systems. However, international law was never intended to function in that way, as it governs complex relationships between equal States rather than individuals, and it lacks enforcement authorities. Measured against domestic law, it will always look unstable. Even on its own, the use-of-force regime is insufficient, and a “world police” is missing, not because effective enforcement is unachievable, but because States chose to sideline it. Disputes have shown that States regularly escape scrutiny and bypass laws, reinforcing the need for international law to adapt to an ever-evolving global and political landscape. International law is struggling, largely because of its own organs, not because it fails to meet the standards of domestic law.

In fact, the UN’s own use of force is weak, given its lack of a standing army. Article 43 of the Charter was intended to grant the Security Council a direct mechanism for enforcing military action by requiring member States to make armed forces available to the Council at its request. Notwithstanding this, no such ad hoc arrangement was established under Article 43; Cold War rivalries made cooperation difficult and politically impossible. Ever since, the provision has been rendered meaningless. Hence, the absence of a standing army for the UN has forced the Security Council to resort to other means of securing military action – voluntary contributions by member States, regional bodies or peacekeeping troops. Even when the Council decides to act against a threat to world peace under Chapter VII, its ability to enforce depends entirely on States’ willingness to provide troops (Levin, 2024).

The Veto: Why Does It Still Exist?

Paralysis Within the UN

Due to a myriad of reasons, the Security Council has experienced significant paralysis among its permanent members. The frequency of veto use has increased in recent years, with Russia exercising it 120 times in the last decade. Members of the P5, particularly Russia, China and the U.S., abuse their veto power for their own advantage. This has led to significant controversy both within the UN and in the public eye. Vetoes have prevented UN intervention in multiple cases where it was needed, including conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Palestine and Ukraine (Pak, 2020). Permanent members often resort to vetoes when intervention would affect their own interests. For example, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022, an action that directly implicated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State (United Nations, 1945). 

On 25th February 2022, the Security Council considered a resolution deploring Russia’s aggression and demanding the withdrawal of its forces; the resolution received 11 votes in favour, with China, India and the UAE abstaining, but Russia vetoed it (United Nations, 2022). Consequently, the Council could not adopt any binding measure against the very State whose conduct it was addressing, despite overwhelming support among the remaining members. This case clearly illustrates the Council’s structural paralysis. Since a P5 member can veto action against its own conduct, the institution designed under Article 24 of the Charter to bear primary responsibility for international peace and security can be rendered powerless whenever its intervention is most urgently needed (United Nations, 1945).

Chapter VI of the Charter outlines how the Security Council can handle disputes. Titled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, the chapter sets out the principle that disputes could threaten international peace and should be addressed through peaceful means rather than extreme, coercive measures. It gives the Security Council the role of mediator, investigator and recommender in disputes. A key provision is the obligatory abstention rule in Article 27(3) (Kato, 2025). This rule requires all members, including the P5, to abstain from voting under Chapter VI of the Charter if they are parties to a dispute. This rule should have significant implications, especially in the context of international conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the Council has largely ignored it. Despite these deviations, the Council has taken almost no action to enforce it. In this case, Russia’s repeated vetoes directly defy the rule. The issue the UN faces is the power it sees in the Security Council. By defying the abstention rule, the P5 expose an uncomfortable reality: they are the most powerful nations in the UN, and nobody can stop them.

In other cases, members have invoked their veto power to support their allies. Following the Hamas attacks on 7th October 2023 and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, mounting civilian casualties put pressure on the Security Council to respond to the deepening humanitarian crisis. In December 2023, the United States vetoed a draft resolution demanding an immediate humanitarian ceasefire, despite the resolution receiving 13 votes in favour, with only the UK abstaining alongside the US veto (MI, 2024). The US vetoed a second ceasefire resolution again in February 2024, reinforcing this pattern of obstruction despite comparable levels of Council support (MI, 2024). As a result, resolutions demanding an immediate ceasefire, repeatedly blocked despite near-unanimous backing among Council members, have led to significant delays in any collective peacemaking effort and prolonged civilian suffering. This demonstrates how the veto can generate selective enforcement of international humanitarian norms, particularly when a P5 member’s use of the veto appears to prioritise a longstanding strategic alliance over near-consensus international demands for civilian protection.

In cases such as these, the rule on obligatory abstention is difficult to enforce. Some argue that the rule prevents the parties directly involved in the dispute from voting or participating in the process of forming resolutions. This rule becomes problematic when an ally of a party uses its power to influence the council’s decision. For example, the Syrian Civil War began in 2011 amid wider unrest of the Arab Spring, generating sustained pressure for an international response through the UN Security Council.

Since the conflict began in 2011, Russia has vetoed 16 resolutions. These vetoes have contributed to the deaths of nearly a quarter of a million Syrian civilians, the arrest of almost 150,000 others, and the persistence of widespread impunity by 2020 (Pak, 2020). This indicates Russia’s prioritisation of strategic and political interests over collective humanitarian action. Because of this repeated obstruction, the Security Council could not reach consensus on collective action, leading to a fragmented international response, with individual States and coalitions acting outside the Council’s framework. This shows how the veto can protect a permanent member’s strategic ally, obstruct the enforcement of international law and preserve a P5 member’s regional influence. There has been discussion about whether allies of the parties should be allowed to vote or use their vetoes to assist their allied States; however, this would significantly decrease the number of parties allowed to vote. The Council has not determined a clear solution; however, most parties have agreed that they must find a way to enforce the obligatory abstention rule.

Member States’ Opinions

Since the signing of the UN Charter, countries worldwide have joined the UN as members, bringing their opinions on the structure of the Security Council. Although all are permanent members of the Council, the P5 utilise their veto power very differently and hold different attitudes towards it. While the UK and France have not used theirs since 1989, with France even urging its fellow members to voluntarily suspend veto use in the face of mass atrocities (Evans, 2015), the other three members, especially Russia, have seen no problem with vetoing resolutions (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025).

The fact remains that despite rhetorical support for bids for permanent seats, no resolution that would truly dilute their veto power has even made it to a formal adoption vote, with texts often lacking the consensus required to achieve two-thirds support and the agreement of all P5 members serving as the biggest hurdle.

This goal was nearly achieved when the US, France and the UK backed the 2022 Veto Initiative resolution, which passed and now requires a debate after any use of the veto by the Security Council, but not before (United Nations, 2022). There is also a record of P5 support for “associate permanent members” — members with permanent seats without veto power. The clearest example is the United States’ decision to back the motion to assign two permanent seats without veto power to the African continent, in addition to their their pre-existing non-permanent seats (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024), which, as of 2026, still has not passed. However, neither this initiative nor this motion can reverse vetoes, extend veto power or revoke it, and therefore has virtually no effect on the landscape of the P5’s power.

The P5 may express theoretical support in press briefings and general assembly sessions, but if they truly backed these Security Council reforms, they would help build consensus in favour of the resolutions by advocating for them during debates and summits. Their actions over the past decades — or lack thereof — reflect a reluctance to share or dilute their veto power in any meaningful way, an attitude that is far from unexpected. The theory of realism holds that politics is governed by human nature (Notre Dame International Security Center, 2022); thus, States engage in the struggle for power to survive and cling tightly to it when they acquire it, including when it is a form of prohibitive power, such as the veto. In the long run, this attitude lowers the credibility of reform proposals that involve the voluntary withdrawal of any P5 member from their seats and spells continued reform paralysis.

On the other side of the spectrum is the G4, which comprises four non-permanent Security Council members: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. This coalition serves as an ideological counterpoint to the P5. These four countries were first united in 2005 with the shared goal of securing permanent seats on the Security Council, and they support each other’s candidacies while campaigning for structural change within the UNSC. The G4’s proposal envisages a “25-member Security Council”, a drastic expansion from the current 15, with an additional four non-permanent and six permanent members.

Over the past 20 years, the G4 has remained committed to securing permanent membership, leveraging relevant moments, such as United Nations anniversaries, to reinforce the need for reform. Notably, recognising the P5’s reluctance to extend veto power to other members, the G4 made the concession that, if appointed as permanent members, they would be willing to forgo the veto for an initial 15-year period, after which the issue would be reviewed to determine whether the veto power would be extended (Rolf, Janssen & Liedtke, 2021). This demonstrated a strong desire to prevent Security Council reform from stalling completely, even if it required them to concede on their aim of becoming full permanent members. Even so, like every other Security Council reform proposal, the G4 has seen little success. Their most recent effort was a renewal of their demands at the 2025 UNGA, reiterating that “discussions on Security Council reform need not be confined to the [Intergovernmental Negotiations]”, and urging the membership to engage wholeheartedly in advancing change in the face of “instability in the international order” (Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, 2025).

It may seem intuitive that those in the highest seats of power are content with the current system that affords them that power, whereas those further from the centre of power advocate more radical change. However, some factions occupy a middle ground between these two positions and pursue smaller-scale change. The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) coalition fits this role perfectly.

In 1995, Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and Egypt founded the Coffee Club, which rebranded as the Uniting for Consensus group in 2005. These four countries were united by a shared rejection of increasing the number of non-permanent seats in the Security Council. This core idea soon attracted over 40 countries, including Canada and Spain, to join the initial four. The group was introduced in 2005 and brought a draft resolution to expand the number of non-permanent seats from 10 to 20. Though it ultimately never reached a formal vote due to insufficient support (Swart, 2015), the UfC has remained steadfast in its opposition to new permanent members, arguing that increasing the number of permanent seats would entrench privilege and dilute the already meagre influence of medium and small member States. Beyond its initial proposal, its overall model includes longer-term, non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate re-election, a reform that “[aims] to assure that the future UNSC is more democratic, representative, efficient and accountable toward the entire membership” (Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN, n.d.).

While the UfC lacks its own charter or treaty, its legal footing rests on the UN Charter itself. Under Article 108, amending the Charter requires two-thirds of member States to both adopt it by vote and ratify it (Model Diplomat, 2026). Along with collectively voting against reforms to expand permanent membership, the UfC emphasises that Article 108 cannot be bypassed and has therefore been highly successful as a blocking coalition against key opponents’ attempts at major reform over the past two decades, such as the G4 or the African bloc. By insisting on the Article 108 threshold, the UfC effectively raises the bar for any reform that would create new permanent seats, making it politically unattainable.

In summary, while the P5 remain largely content with the status quo, other members have taken a variety of positions on Security Council reform over the past 80 years, with some advocating significant restructuring and others more moderate changes. Two common threads emerge. First, none of these collectives has achieved its goals; their proposals were too unpopular to reach a formal adoption vote, dying on the debate stage without ever becoming formal resolutions. Secondly, no P5 member has officially joined any of these collectives, at most providing rhetorical support in public addresses. Stepping back, the picture is increasingly clear: sadly disharmonious. Despite virtually every UN member State expressing discontent or calling for some form of change, the big picture of reform remains frozen, held in place by a lack of consensus and Article 108, for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

International law faces a crisis as its core institutions falter. The UN Charter’s prohibition on force, once a steadfast principle, is now inconsistently applied and politically manipulated, evident in conflicts like Nicaragua, Kosovo, Syria, Ukraine and Gaza (United Nations, 1945). The ICJ highlights systemic fragility; its rulings expose vague criteria for “armed attack” and self-defence, creating interpretive issues and undermining authority (ICJ, 1986; Boyle, 1987; Santos, 2026). Its inability to address major conflicts, exemplified by its dismissal of Yugoslavia v NATO, erodes confidence in justice. The Security Council epitomises paralysis, its structure favouring the P5, with vetoes used as tools of obstruction – Russia’s vetoes on Syria and Ukraine, and U.S. vetoes in Gaza, exemplify systemic injustice. The rule requiring abstentions is routinely ignored, leaving the Council powerless when it is most needed (United Nations, 2022; 1945).

This paralysis has had devastating consequences. Russia’s vetoes of UN intervention in Syria caused hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. In Ukraine, the Council’s inability to act exposed its limits. In Gaza, U.S. vetoes prolonged suffering and eroded trust in the UN’s ability to help in crises (United Nations, 2022). These examples show that when a permanent Council member’s interests clash with a dispute, international law breaks down and becomes a political battle rather than a legal issue.

Efforts to reform the Security Council repeatedly fail. The G4 coalition has proposed expanding the council’s permanent membership and even offered to forgo vetoes for 15 years (Rolf, Janssen & Liedtke, 2021). However, reform stalls because the P5 are reluctant to reduce their influence and because Article 108’s amendment rules are difficult to change (Model Diplomat, 2026). This paralysis shows that the powerful, who benefit most from the current system, refuse change.

If international law relies on outdated, unjust institutions prioritising power, its legitimacy erodes. States ignore the Charter, interpret self-defence freely, and block humanitarian intervention. The ICJ remains hampered by consent and cannot hold States accountable, while the Security Council serves its own interests, fracturing global relations. The UN Charter’s promise to prevent war becomes meaningless (United Nations, 1945). However, this crisis is reversible. Reform should limit veto use, especially in cases of mass violence and law violations. Enforcing the abstention rule prevents States from voting on matters involving them. The P5’s power must be curtailed to avoid political manipulation. The ICJ’s jurisdiction needs strengthening by reducing reliance on consent, enabling decisive action in genocide and violence cases. The Security Council’s composition should reflect current realities, not post-WWII structures. International law aims for collective responsibility for peace, not mirroring domestic systems. Its legitimacy suffers as political interests dominate, but fixing these institutions can restore credibility. The system’s flaws lie within its organs; they must prioritise progress over power. The international legal order needs a system that can effectively address conflicts and promote global stability.

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