Abstract

This paper examines the enforcement deficit at the heart of international law, arguing that the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are structurally undermined by their dependence on State cooperation and by politicised judicial elections. Only 36% of ICC arrest warrants have been executed, and the al-Bashir, Putin and Netanyahu cases reveal how sovereignty, economic dependence and Security Council vetoes shield powerful States from accountability. The Nicaragua, LaGrand and Corfu Channel cases expose parallel weaknesses in the ICJ, where P5 influence and re-election incentives compromise impartiality. The paper proposes domestically embedded International Compliance Police (ICP) units, reformed electoral procedures and a periodically rotating regional bench, while candidly assessing their feasibility under the Rome Statute and the UN Charter. It then contends that the same paralysis afflicts responses to climate change, cyber security and weapons of mass destruction, where treaties lack verification and enforcement mechanisms. Without consequences for non-compliance, international law risks becoming merely advisory.

Introduction

Despite its founding goal of fostering global peace, the United Nation’s (UN) recent failures highlight how territorial boundaries hinder peace. The conflict between State non-compliance and sovereignty is clear, seen in unfulfilled arrests and ignored environmental protocols. This paper examines the ongoing inability to manage humanitarian crises and calls for legal reform.

The bloodstains visible from space in Sudan underscore the urgent need for reform. Does recognising atrocities and assigning blame help or hinder justice within the UN framework? A backlog of stalled projects, systemic crises and blocked humanitarian resolutions reveal systemic sabotage. The framework is becoming increasingly dysfunctional in the face of emerging, multifaceted challenges.

Established post-WWII, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was created in 1945 to settle disputes between States, with 15 judges elected by the UN General Assembly and Security Council for nine-year terms. The International Crimincal Court (ICC) was formed in 2002 under the 1998 Rome Statute to prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. The UN also facilitates international cooperation, exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol, the first binding climate treaty under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The issues discussed are interconnected. Proposed amendments consider feasibility, risks and aim to evolve international law to address contemporary challenges.

The International Criminal Court

The current structural system of the ICC does not facilitate proportional mediation of conflicts. Although in-court proceedings are constitutionally bound to impartiality, the greatest impediment remains fragile, as enforcement depends on State cooperation.

The ICC’s limited enforcement power directly impedes cases, resulting in minimal arrests. Because it lacks military resources and a police force, the UN cannot ensure arrest warrants are executed. Of 61 arrest warrants issued, only 22 suspects have been detained; this includes those who surrendered or appeared voluntarily, meaning fulfilled arrest warrants amount to a meagre 36%.

The 22 suspects have been apprehended through international cooperation among States that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute. The ICC also depends on domestic police forces to honour arrest warrants, subject to iron-clad limitations on State sovereignty that require foreign powers to refrain from threatening or using force against territorial integrity or political independence. This is done with exceptional consideration of regime change, as seen with Laurent Gbagbo (Prosecutor v. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, 2019), and under the lead of the UNSC, which may invoke Chapter VII to detain individuals internationally, given a unanimous decision by the Security Council.

Evidently, the ICC is structurally designed with meticulous respect for State sovereignty and the protection of States’ political interests. This structure serves territorial power, promotes fairness beyond the ICJ and protects against economic collapse. 

Relying on the UN Security Council (UNSC) certainly opens the door to undue influence from economic interests and geopolitical alliances. In recent years, however, the increasing use of the veto has been described as hindering its functionality. Far from being an arbiter, the UNSC has, in leading cases, been accused of partisan advocacy, intervening and abstaining to serve political and economic interests. For example, there have been repeated Russian vetoes of resolutions (BBC News, 2017) aimed at humanitarian crises under Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, believed to be due to Russia’s naval foothold in the Mediterranean (Lowy Institute, 2019); and, famously, the United States has issued more than 53 vetoes concerning Israel (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2023), vetoing six resolutions that demanded Israel follow international humanitarian law (UN News, 2025).

Beyond the UNSC, it is wholly unrealistic to expect States to surrender their own oppressive leader, especially given the existing non-cooperation of foreign States in the arrest and surrender of suspects on their territory. Numerous failures illustrate this, notably the case of Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, who travelled to 19 different countries – nine of which were signatories to the Rome Statute (Access Accountability, 2019), which effectively binds them with the legal responsibility to detain suspects on domestic territory – while an arrest warrant was active.

This is further demonstrated by Putin’s visit to Mongolia, a State party that did not comply with the arrest warrant. Mongolia defended itself by arguing that, because of its heavy dependence on Russia, it could not risk severing ties; it had imported 95% of its petroleum and 20% of its electricity from Russia, claiming the supply was critical to its own existence and that of its people. This directly corroborates the dangerous criticism aimed at the ICC’s asymmetrical application of justice.

Partiality is revealed in the response to Netanyahu’s proposed visit to Hungary and Poland. Netanyahu was promised safety from detention in Poland, following a resolution, to celebrate the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, despite the warrant out for his arrest. Nevertheless, do war crime survivors and martyrs want to be celebrated by a suspected war criminal? A Polish opinion poll shows that 59.2% of respondents believe Netanyahu should be arrested if he came, with only 24.2% in favour of his attendance (Deutsche Welle, 2025). Similarly, Hungary temporarily withdrew from the Rome Statute, without integrating the law into domestic legislation, to allow the same visitation rights.

“It is ultimately only public opinion and the reputation of the States Parties that can lead States to comply with their international law obligations”, a quote from Justice Richard Goldstone that underscores the brutal reality that powerful countries do not need to follow international law and will find every opportunity to circumvent it. When politics takes precedence over humanitarian values and the ICC cannot proceed with arrest warrants, it creates instability and renders the ICC useless in preventing further crises.

The ICC: How do we fix this?

Despite partial sovereignty, the ICC’s influence remains limited by its lack of enforcement power and the geopolitical interests shaping judicial elections. To address these issues, we propose strengthening domestic enforcement mechanisms and reforming the judicial electoral system. 

Although enhancing domestic police autonomy may seem unrealistic, a subgroup – potentially called the International Compliance Police (ICP) – could be established within national police forces. While remaining domestically recruited and operated, the ICP would be legally obliged to comply with the ICC on specific tasks, even when this conflicts with the government. Analogous to the statutory independence of central banks, this would require a new treaty or a major amendment to the Rome Statute, as well as constitutional reforms. However, conflicts with governments and existing police forces, alongside State non-compliance, make this solution highly hypothetical. Therefore, strict ICC supervision and regulation would be critical.

Reforming judicial elections is a more realistic alternative. Since political interests may influence current elections, judges could be selected according to the preferences of the majority of States Parties. Although this may openly politicise the Court, it would increase transparency and reduce obscure political influence. This would require a substantive amendment to the Rome Statute and a seven-eighths majority of States Parties. While implementation would take time and major powers may resist, greater transparency could ultimately strengthen the ICC’s perceived impartiality.

The International Court of Justice

The ICJ is a core organ of international law, handling matters between sovereign States and a wide range of internationally binding disputes. Although the Court remains legally authoritative, several cases highlight core structural issues.

The 1984 case opposing Nicaragua to the USA (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua vs United States of America, 9 April 1984), where the defendant did not participate in the proceedings and did not pay the required compensatory amount for the use of excessive force and interference in Nicaraguan internal affairs, is a clear example of State non-compliance, which constitutes one of the core issues within the ICJ.

As with the ICC, the ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction presents a substantial barrier, compounded by State non-compliance. As the ICC cannot enforce its warrants in States over which it lacks jurisdiction, due to the consent-based approach to ratification and signing of binding treaties, which heavily depends on a State’s core political and legal interests, the ICJ fails to effectively penalise States, as depicted in the 1999 LaGrand case, opposing the United States of America to Germany (LaGrand, Germany vs United States of America, 2 May 1999). Furthermore, politics plays a pivotal role in judicial elections within the ICJ, as the UN Security Council and General Assembly elect justices. This bleeds into ad hoc elections, as portrayed in the case of Judge Daxner in the 1948 Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom vs Albania).

State non-compliance has been a pervasive concern throughout the ICJ’s history. As seen in the aforementioned case concerning paramilitary operations within Nicaragua, the defendant was charged with the use of excessive force, breaches of sovereignty due to naval incursions and interference in Nicaragua’s internal affairs (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua vs United States of America, 9 April 1984). Nicaragua demanded $17 billion in compensation; however, the defendant boycotted the proceedings and did not comply with the judgment. This case highlights the court’s ineffective enforcement approach, especially when a P5 State is involved. As an organ of international justice, the ICJ’s lack of power over P5 States directly harms its credibility as a mediator in international disputes.

Furthermore, in the case opposing Germany to the USA (LaGrand, Germany vs United States of America, 2 May 1999), the matter at hand was the execution of the LaGrand brothers. They were not informed of their right to consular assistance after their arrest, which violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963). Following the proceedings instituted by Germany on 2nd May 1999, the ICJ implemented provisional measures to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed on 3rd May 1999, his brother Karl having been executed earlier in February of that year. The US failed to comply with the ICJ’s provisional measures issued to prevent the executions, which exemplifies the discrepancies caused by the ICJ’s ineffective enforcement measures.

P5 States customarily hold seats on the bench, which inevitably creates bias within the Court’s core structure. The possibility of re-election increases judicial bias towards P5 members, as their votes informally carry greater political weight than those of other States. This, in turn, encourages favourable relationships between P5 States and independent justices and undermines Articles 2 and 20 of the ICJ Statute on judicial impartiality (Statute of the International Court of Justice, International Court of Justice, 1945).

The ICJ’s lack of resources and capacity to enforce its rulings is a core issue that prevents it from effectively mediating disputes between States and, consequently, undermines the credibility of international law as a whole. The electoral process within the ICJ reinforces the Court’s politically binding implications, as sovereign States compete for a place on the bench. Article 2 of the ICJ Statute states that judges must remain independent irrespective of nationality or political affiliation (Statute of the International Court of Justice, International Court of Justice, 1945). The UN elects judges through two bodies: the Security Council and the General Assembly. Candidates must secure a majority vote in both, which may seem like a measure to prevent bias but, in reality, is the first pillar of elections that are heavily politically motivated, as voting passes through State-led bodies rather than strictly judicial frameworks. While there is no substantial evidence as of now, we can reasonably claim that this structure adds to the fragility of the Court’s credibility.

Furthermore, the presence of permanent Council members and superior governing bodies within the UN (P5 members) may lead judges to foster favourable relationships with these members during their nine-year term to increase the likelihood of re-election. The rather “casual” nature of elections within the ICJ also contributes, as it highlights the subversion of judicial qualifications in favour of political affiliations and favourable relationships with the unofficially governing States within the UN. 

While it is unreasonable to compare bias in the international judicial system with that in domestic, common and civil law frameworks, it is irrefutable that this system of politicised elections fractures public trust in the impartiality and equality of the legal system, stripping away its credibility. Amending the problematic clauses of the statute, such as re-elections and the politicisation of judicial elections, would present a significant challenge, as it would inevitably decentralise the P5 and diminish the effectiveness of their veto power. 

Because the amendment would have to pass through a vote by the UN Secretary-General, while P5 States could still exercise their veto power over the vote, it would be inherently politicised and add another layer of difficulty to the amendment process.

While introducing ad hoc elections raises a clear issue of impartiality among elected judges, it remains only partial, as judges appointed by their nation are likely to harbour bias towards that nation, which may cancel out the presupposed bias on either side of the arbitration. As seen during the Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom vs Albania, 22 May 1947), Judge Daxner was elected by Albania. Daxner had a reputation as a highly aggressive judicial officer, notably during the 1946-7 trial of Jozef Tiso, working with Czechoslovak politicians to guarantee Tiso’s death penalty (Hudson, 1950)

Daxner was the sole dissenter when the question of the ICJ’s jurisdiction over Albania arose in March 1948. In the early objection, the vote was 15-1 in favour of rejecting Albania’s claim, an attempt to avoid accountability. In arbitration cases, bias is balanced between the opposing parties, as both have judges arguing their case, preserving the element of fairness essential to equitable and admissible proceedings. The political nature of the ICJ’s judicial election process can be mitigated by removing re-elections or rearranging the existing bench, giving other nations an equitable chance to secure a seat.

Additionally, while Atate voting may undermine the court’s credibility, the Court’s statute provides a solid foundation for its core structure. Although States may not fully respect its clauses, they remain firmly embedded in the Court’s integrity. Amending them would require independence from the UN. Problematic election frameworks can be amended if two-thirds of member States consent. As an organ of international law, the ICJ is built upon robust frameworks that interlink to provide the most equitable trials for sovereign States (Statute of the International Court of Justice, International Court of Justice, 1945). As with the aforementioned ad hoc elections, the bias in both parties’ representation balances out the potential for a flawed arbitration process. Although amending largely problematic sections of the statute may seem incredibly difficult because of the needlessly ambiguous process, it remains a viable solution to the issues in the Court’s current structure.

As the court derives its authority from the United Nations Charter (United Nations, 1945), it would be unwise to separate the structures for a merely administrative matter such as amendments. Instead, States can cooperate through a simplified process for amending the Court’s statute. This would create a stronger framework of guidelines aligned with judicial impartiality and electoral procedure, enabling the ICJ to function more reliably and comprehensively.

The ICJ: What Can Be Done?

Since both organs face similar limitations – a lack of coercive power and concerns about political bias – analogous solutions could also be applied to the ICJ.

Alongside the hypothetical ICP, designated units within domestic police forces could be legally required to comply with ICJ orders. These units would bring State representatives before the Court, enforce its judgments and monitor State compliance. As the ICJ operates within the UN system, this would require either amendments to the UN Charter or a separate multilateral treaty granting these units immunity from government interference and placing them under strict ICJ supervision. Domestic constitutions would also need to be amended accordingly. Although initial State non-compliance remains a significant obstacle, such a system could substantially strengthen the ICJ’s enforcement capacity if successfully implemented. The ICJ’s judicial selection system is currently vulnerable to political influence, particularly through the election of judges and the use of ad hoc judges, which undermines impartiality. To mitigate this, we propose replacing the current system of fixed-term judges with a more diverse and periodically rotating bench. For instance, judges could be randomly selected from different regions every four years, with AI-assisted selection to minimise manipulation. Furthermore, multiple judges representing distinct political perspectives could replace individual national representatives, creating greater ideological balance. Similar reforms could be applied to ad hoc judges by ensuring broader political and regional diversity.

Implementing these reforms would require amendments to the ICJ Statute, an integral part of the UN Charter, and would require approval by two-thirds of the General Assembly and the Security Council, including the absence of a P5 veto. Although increasing judicial diversity and rotation could complicate the Court’s structure, such reforms could reduce political bias and ensure that the ICJ functions primarily as an institution for international justice and peace rather than one influenced by geopolitical interests.

Once the failures are analysed, the core issues of the ICC and ICJ become clearer, making it easier to discern broader patterns of transformative progress. Where we see enforcement incapacity become a prerogative of powerful countries, we also see the same paralysis in international cooperation on evolving crises. The UN’s credibility effectively degrades, as the urgency of climate change and other issues is not met with balanced action.

International Law: What Is Really Existential?

International law must address certain challenges that do not necessarily involve international relations. These issues, though not all man-made, have been significantly contributed to by humans, which means we have a responsibility to understand their implications and address them. Climate change is slowly but surely placing the Earth at existential risk that cannot be reversed; cyber security leaves national sovereignty vulnerable; and weapons of mass destruction create a looming threat that may act as a deterrent to real nuclear, biological or chemical warfare, but it is a risk that should not ever have been deemed necessary. International agencies have been addressing these issues deftly over the years, but the question we must ask is whether their efforts have been successful, and why they have not. We must also discuss the importance of international legal systems placing these issues at the forefront of priorities; though we will look at three specific emerging examples, many more also need attention.

Climate Change

Climate change has long been a topic, whether featured on social media, in pamphlets or taught in schools. However, conversations often focus on global consequences such as rising sea levels, changing weather and melting glaciers, while overlooking everyday impacts. Everyday impacts include more frequent and intense heatwaves, longer droughts, more intense and frequent wildfires, and more. 

While climate concerns were initially overlooked, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol shifted the global perspective by establishing the first international treaty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol commits industrialised countries and economies in transition to limit emissions. Its main aim was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels in Annex 1 countries and to encourage the transfer of green technologies among countries. Though the Kyoto Protocol was a step forward in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, its effectiveness was limited by the pressure placed on industrialised countries and by the fact that the United States never ratified the Protocol, which meant the Protocol itself was not active or legally valid, especially when the US was a huge emitter of greenhouse gases.

The Kyoto Protocol has not been the only agreement on climate change. 20 years later, a new landmark UN agreement emerged: the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015 by almost every country. The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change; 195 parties adopted it at the UN climate change conference (COP21) in Paris, France, on 12th December 2015. It aims to strengthen the global response to climate change by keeping the global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

Because the Paris Agreement is known for its benefits and for addressing the rising concern about climate change, a few things are worth considering about its impact. For the first time, all countries have acknowledged that the effects of historic and ongoing emissions will have serious, lasting consequences for Earth’s natural systems. On the downside, the agreement raises crucial questions about accountability and transparency. There is no process to verify whether the 195 countries’ independently reported greenhouse gas inventories or progress is indeed towards their targets, unlike in the UK, where the Committee on Climate Change has a key role in assessing and verifying domestic emissions reductions. In reality, this should be a huge problem; it undermines the agreement’s goals if 195 countries cannot be held accountable for their progress. This should raise alarms about rising transparency concerns that threaten the deal.

Cyber Security

Cyber security is another threat that only grows more lethal. One of the biggest concerns regarding cyber security is its variety and ambiguity. Cyber-attacks have a laundry list of targets, including but not limited to intellectual property, communications, healthcare, commerce and even a party’s ability to provide public services. All of these can, in some form, be attributed to a nation’s infrastructure, which means better cyber security will lead to better infrastructure in a world rapidly accelerating toward an era defined by technology.

The Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention (2001), was the first treaty on cybercrime, enacted by the Council of Europe. Its goal was to make data interference, system interference, computer-related forgery, etc. criminal under the States that were parties to it. It also sought to create greater international harmony on cyber-related issues, given how varied cybercrime can be. Unfortunately, the treaty proved slow and unsuccessful, as many issues remained about how legal systems can pursue a technological agent when the entity is not based domestically. As a result, enforcement was incredibly slow, which encouraged the convention to seek amendments (Daskal & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020).

In 2012, the Second Additional Protocol opened for negotiation to address these challenges; however, the COVID-19 pandemic delayed its progress. It was officially signed in 2022, and since then it has established a new framework for how countries can address cyber threats at the national level. A key flaw is that it does not apply to the private technology sector; yet most cyber-attacks involve private technology. Another issue the protocol did not account for is the difficulty of obtaining electronic evidence, given how quickly information moves through cyberspace (Sandeep, 2026). If we take a traditional approach to modern issues, we will never find a solution that addresses the root problems.

This treaty also focused mainly on the broad scope of cyber security, but arguably more interesting is which specific threats are being used and how international law responds to the intricacies of technological security.

When it comes to that, there are growing concerns over the misuse of information and communication technologies by terrorists, in particular the internet and new technologies, to commit, incite, recruit, fund or plan terrorist attacks. Recently, in the UK, three airports – London Stansted, Manchester and East Midlands – were hit by a cyber-attack in which 8.7 million customers’ data was accessed (Docker & Trewern, 2026). With the new assessed information retrieved from the 8.7 million customers, they are unsure of what their information is being used for or what dangers it could entail, now that dangerous hackers have, by some means, infiltrated their personal details.

This is why member States have stressed the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation in tackling this threat, including among international, regional and subregional organisations, as well as the private sector and civil society, in Security Council Resolution 2341 (2017) and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS).

Artificial intelligence is the cornerstone of innovation and affects almost every aspect of technological life. As a result, international law must monitor AI effectively, especially amid cyber security threats. AI is a tool for both cyber defence and attack, but its main flaw is its lack of transparency; it is not yet generative, meaning it can only build on what has already been made. AI has also accelerated our need for advanced infrastructure that relies more heavily on a stable energy grid. While this has spurred technological innovation, it also leaves the world vulnerable to cyber-attacks (SpiceWorks, 2021). Multiple treaties aim to govern AI in relation to cyber security; however, most provide frameworks for AI and focus on ethical reasoning rather than enforceable norms: for example, UNESCO’s Recommendation on the ethics of Artificial Intelligence (UNESCO, 2022). There is an exception, however. The Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence is the first-ever treaty on the regulation of AI; nevertheless, it has yet to be ratified due to there being insufficient State signatories (Council of Europe, 2024).

Despite this, the convention has strong potential to shape ethical AI development. On cyber security, Article 5 requires parties to use AI with the intent of democracy and the rule of law, with respect to judicial independence, and Article 8 requires party nations to provide “adequate transparency” when using AI systems. The major concern with this, and many other articles in the Convention, is their lack of specificity. Although the treaty states that its purpose is not to give AI an authoritative definition, if States are left to interpret the articles, the treaty fails to institute real regulation.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

In modern times, the term “weapons of mass destruction” has been used to refer to weapons proliferated for nefarious purposes, which are indiscriminate and considered an existential threat to the human race. These weapons include nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons. One of the main purposes of international law is to set a framework for major concerns; however, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have never been specifically defined under any international treaties (United Nations, n.d.). This is because nations use previously established doctrine under international law to define WMD for themselves; a commonly used theory is International Humanitarian Law, which says that WMD should not ever be used during warfare because their use makes it impossible to differentiate between civilian objects and military objects.

The most prominent use of international authority over WMD is found in arms control treaties largely established during the Cold War, such as: the Antarctic Treaty (1961), which demilitarised the continent of Antarctica and established the principle of an area free of nuclear weapons; the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), which followed the Cuban Missile Crisis and addressed both the political and environmental harms of nuclear weapons; and the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which modelled the Antarctic Treaty by banning WMD on any celestial body (PolSci Institute, 2025). In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was put into practice; it is arguably the most important agreement that established a framework for nuclear weapons still used today. This treaty relied on parties’ commitments to three things: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear weapons (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, n.d.).

Although this treaty is generally considered a success, it failed to fully disarm nuclear weapons, and efforts to advance and modernise it have largely been overlooked. The US-Iran military conflict, for example, was initiated on the basis that Iran was a threshold nation for nuclear arms, despite a lack of clear evidence that Iran had attempted to rebuild its nuclear programme since 2003 (Robertson & Farley, 2026). Prosecuting a war founded on the promise of nuclear weapons is just one issue desperately needing to be addressed by international bodies. If the United Nations is truly seeking to rid the world of nuclear weapons, the way in which it is choosing to undertake this task is no longer working; there is a need for revision. International bodies have a duty to accountability, and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation is a clear example of how they are failing in that endeavour. However, nuclear weapons are not the only probable threat to humanity that has been disregarded.

Globally and historically, the development of biological weapons has been regarded as a “secondary priority” compared with the threat posed by nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons are governed by numerous multilateral treaties that support deterrence, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, there is only one multilateral agreement that regulates the use and production of biological weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the first and only multilateral agreement in the world that addresses biological weapons. It has been in force for over 50 years; however, it alone cannot ensure global biosecurity. One key issue with this treaty is its lack of a verification mechanism; it relies on participating States’ transparency. However, this is increasingly difficult as this technology advances. Biotechnology is a two-pronged field; advances in the base technology can enable misuse, and the treaty has no enforcement mechanism to keep States parties unambiguous. Essentially, there is no way to assess State compliance with the prohibitions on biological weapons technology.

This is not unique to biological weapons, either. Chemical and radiological weapons have also been grossly underestimated in comparison with nuclear weapons. Although they are subject to many more international regulations than biological weapons, the vast majority of their treaties are either blanket governance over WMD or share the same issues as the BWC and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They are vague, outdated and not comprehensive enough to address the multi-conditional nature of advancing weapons technology (Tin et al., 2023).

Weapons of mass destruction have been and will certainly remain a hot topic for discussion. Because of this, it is important to assess whether these issues are being handled in an overall fair and net-positive way. Looking just at our current handling of WMD, our dependence on nuclear arms treaties has left us completely overlooking biological arms, a threat that is far more probable and far more devastating. The COVID-19 pandemic showed the world how easily society’s infrastructure and wellbeing can collapse due to a biological attack, yet the banning of these weapons has still not been pursued.

These three key challenges in international law are not individual in nature, either. For example, the original purpose of treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence is being lost because neither was institutionalised or ratified, and though the latter is still open for signatures and could be put into force in the future, there is also concern about its specificity and how that will create regulatory issues. There is also an overarching issue with international law’s ability to enforce the policies it puts in place. Without a real method of regulation, most treaties in regard to modern challenges are merely suggested frameworks that are vague and have far too many open interpretations.

Furthermore, international bodies must be able to adapt as the world changes. As previously discussed, we are rapidly moving towards an age defined by technology, and so treaties that have become outdated, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, cannot address the risks of this new era. All to say that none of these three issues is singular; they are all affected by one another with each precedent international law sets. Nor are they the only issues we can identify as international law currently faces, though they can help us hypothesise how agencies handle other modern crises. International law is complex and deals with issues that have large-scale consequences; however, the more advocacy that goes into shaping these processes, the more agencies will learn how to address them effectively. International law has come a long way since its creation, and it deserves credit. Despite that, international law still has a long way to go before it becomes a definitive law and a reliable source of justice.

Conclusion

The ICC and ICJ face core challenges that undermine international law by weakening enforcement and credibility. The ICC’s lack of enforcement and geopolitical issues allow States to undermine the court, especially when arrests cannot be made, damaging the law’s authority. Similarly, the ICJ’s limited resources and enforcement weaken its legitimacy. UN’s governing bodies may foster subtle favouritism, further hurting credibility. Proposed solutions like the ICP are ineffective due to non-compliance and conflicts. These failures destabilise responses to modern security threats like AI, cyber-attacks and climate change, as weak institutions set dangerous precedents of non-compliance. If States ignore judicial mandates without consequences, international law loses power, especially on urgent issues like climate change. Despite its flaws, international law provides vital frameworks; its systemic weaknesses threaten to overshadow its benefits. It still has potential to evolve into a true source of justice.

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