Abstract

This article researches the extent to which major trade wars like the India-US solar dispute have had an impact on the world’s globalisation and overall international relations. Trade wars historically have had an enormous impact on a country’s economy, from changing the stock market’s volatility to increasing prices at a retail level, leading to consumers facing high prices. Furthermore, de-globalisation is one of the larger problems that could be caused by trade wars and can be categorised by countries putting up tariffs against each other, only trading with specific allies and exploiting resources from countries incessantly.

The methodology used for this research paper is a mixed research method, comparing case studies and quantitative data from websites and academic research papers to assess the countries’ trade integration, gross domestic product (GDP) and tariffs for other countries before and after each trade war. The main case studies discussed in this article are from post-2013: the US-India solar energy dispute in 2014-2017, the Japan-South Korea trade war which was a rebuttal to South Korean court rulings by Japan, the recent US-China trade war, and Russia-EU trade tensions. Our hypothesis is that trade wars do contribute massively to the process of de-globalisation, however, they can be affected by factors such as pandemics and other global crises, and we conclude the exact extent to which that is in our findings.

Introduction

Globalisation has increased international trade and connected countries through complex supply chains. However, since 2013, rising protectionism and major trade conflicts have challenged this integration. Tariffs and retaliatory measures, particularly during the US-China trade war, have encouraged countries and businesses to reconsider their dependence on global supply chains. This has raised questions about whether the global economy is experiencing de-globalisation or simply becoming more regionalised and politically aligned.

This paper therefore asks: “To what extent have major trade wars since 2013 contributed to de-globalisation?”. The paper hypothesises that trade wars have contributed to de-globalisation by increasing trade barriers and encouraging countries to prioritise economic security and supply-chain resilience. However, other factors, including the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions, have also played an important role. This research will compare several major trade conflicts to assess the extent of their contribution to these wider changes.

Context

Globalisation is the increasing economic connection between countries through the movement of goods, services, investment, technology and capital across national borders (Aiyar & Llyina, 2023). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines economic globalisation as the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through the movement of goods, services and capital across borders (IMF, 2008). One of the main features of globalisation has been the growth of international trade, as countries increasingly specialise in producing goods and services and trade with other economies. This has allowed countries to access larger markets, lower production costs and a wider range of products.

A major part of modern globalisation is global value chains (GVCs), where different stages of producing goods take place across several countries (Pananond, Gereffi & Pedersen, 2020). The IMF explains that production activities can be divided into multiple stages, with each stage taking place where it can be carried out most efficiently. These international production networks are known as global value chains. For example, raw materials may be sourced from one country, manufactured in another and assembled somewhere else before being sold internationally. This has increased the economic interdependence between countries because businesses and consumers can become reliant on international suppliers and markets.

Another important feature of globalisation is foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI occurs when a company or investor from one country invests in or establishes a business in another country. International investment is an important part of economic globalisation because it creates financial connections between economies and allows firms to operate across national borders (IMF, 2008). FDI allows businesses to expand internationally and can increase production, employment and economic connections between countries.

Therefore, globalisation can be understood as increasing economic integration, where national economies become more connected and dependent on each other through trade, investment and global supply chains (Jakubik & Van Heuvelen, 2024). This interdependence can create economic benefits through specialisation and efficiency, but it can also make countries more vulnerable to disruptions in international economic relationships. On the other hand, de-globalisation refers to a reduction or reversal of economic integration between countries. It can involve countries becoming less dependent on international trade, reducing their reliance on foreign investment or restructuring global supply chains towards domestic or regional production. The OECD’s research highlights that what is sometimes described as de-globalisation can involve the reorganisation of global value chains rather than the complete withdrawal of countries from international economic integration (Jaax, Miroudot & Van Lieshout, 2023).

De-globalisation is different from simply experiencing slower globalisation. If international trade continues to increase but at a slower rate, this would represent a slowdown in globalisation rather than de-globalisation. De-globalisation requires some form of reduction or restructuring in international economic integration. However, this does not necessarily mean that countries completely stop trading with each other. Trade can instead be redirected towards different countries or regions.

Several indicators can therefore be used to assess de-globalisation. The OECD highlights participation in global value chains as an important way of assessing the level of global economic integration. Trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) can show the importance of international trade to an economy, while FDI inflows can provide an indication of the level of international investment entering a country. Changes in bilateral trade (involving two nations reducing or eliminating tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers directly between themselves, according to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)) can show whether countries are becoming less economically connected to particular trading partners. Supply-chain integration and the introduction of new trade barriers can also provide evidence of countries attempting to reduce their international dependence. For this research, de-globalisation will therefore be assessed through changes in trade as a percentage of GDP, bilateral trade and FDI inflows before and after major trade disputes. These indicators allow measurable changes in economic integration to be compared across the case studies.

Another important topic discussed in this article is trade conflicts and wars. Trade wars occur when countries impose trade restrictions on one another, often through tariffs, quotas or other barriers to imports. The WTO defines tariffs as customs duties on merchandise imports, which can give similar locally produced goods a price advantage over imported goods (World Trade Organisation, n.d.). A tariff is a tax placed on imported goods, making them more expensive and potentially encouraging consumers to purchase domestically produced goods. When one country introduces tariffs, the affected country may respond with retaliatory tariffs, creating an escalating cycle of trade restrictions. Trade wars are closely connected to protectionism, which involves governments taking measures to protect domestic industries from foreign competition. The WTO defines protectionism as the deliberate use or encouragement of restrictions on imports to allow domestic producers to compete more successfully with foreign producers. Protectionist policies can include tariffs, subsidies, domestic-content requirements and other restrictions on imports. Although these policies may benefit particular domestic industries, they can also increase costs for consumers and businesses and disrupt international supply chains.

The World Trade Organisation plays an important role in global economic governance by providing rules for international trade and a framework for resolving trade disputes between countries. The WTO describes its system as a multilateral trading system based on common rules between its members (WTO, 2025). The WTO is based largely on multilateralism, where countries cooperate through common international rules rather than acting independently. Trade disputes can therefore demonstrate a tension between multilateral trade governance and unilateralism, where countries take trade measures independently to pursue their own economic or political objectives.

Trade wars can also reflect increasing economic nationalism, where governments prioritise domestic economic interests, national security and economic self-reliance over the efficiency gained through international trade. This can encourage governments and businesses to reduce dependence on particular countries and relocate production or develop domestic alternatives. This creates an important connection between trade wars and de-globalisation. If tariffs and other trade restrictions cause countries to reduce bilateral trade, restructure supply chains and rely more heavily on domestic or regional production, they could contribute to de-globalisation. However, if trade is simply redirected towards alternative trading partners, then the result may be trade fragmentation or regionalisation rather than complete de-globalisation. This distinction is supported by OECD research, which found no general trend towards de-globalisation up to 2020 and instead identified continued high levels of global value-chain integration alongside changes in how production was organised (OECD, 2024). This is important when analysing the four case studies later in this paper.

Methodology

For our methodology, we used both comparative case studies and quantitative techniques. We chose a varied mix of case studies from across the globe, making sure to see both sides of each trade war and ensure that they gave good arguments for and against de-globalisation from trade. The main case studies discussed in this article are: (1) the US-India solar energy dispute in 2014-2017, focusing on the use of protectionism by both countries; (2) the Japan-South Korea trade war which was a rebuttal to South Korean court rulings by Japan; (3) the recent US-China trade war, using the most up-to-date information (2024) to conclude whether this ongoing battle is contributing to the global supply chains; and (4) the Russia-EU trade tensions, which allowed us to examine the close-knit union of free trade. Our mixed method approach allowed us to make a more accurate opinion as the quantitative data allows changes in trade and investment to be measured before and after trade conflict, whilst the qualitative analysis using each case study’s economic effect after the trade war can provide context for understanding why these changes occurred. We concluded that using both approaches allows the research to identify measurable changes while considering other wider factors such as geopolitical tensions of the world and the COVID-19 pandemic.

REASONING FOR CASE STUDIES

We chose the India-US trade dispute over solar technology because it showed how both countries used WTO trade rules and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) articles to protect their country and promote their own products instead of using other countries’, which ultimately led to de-globalisation through receding bilateral trade between the two countries showing an early example of protectionism and domestic industrial policy. The Russia-EU tensions demonstrate the relationship between geopolitical conflict and trade restrictions within members of a continent. Next, the Japan-South Korea dispute provides an example of trade restrictions affecting strategic global supply chains, whilst the ongoing US-China trade war represents a large-scale tariff conflict and provides the main case for examining supply-chain restructuring to avoid tariffs and penalties for goods passing within each country.

MEASURING DE-GLOBALISATION

We decided to measure de-globalisation quantitatively through changes in trade as a percentage of the countries’ GDP, bilateral trade between the two or more countries in the dispute, and FDI inflows of the country (OECD, 2024b). For each case study, we compared the indicators before and after the conflict. A reduction in trade relative to GDP, lower FDI flows or declining bilateral trade would provide evidence that the country would have reduced economic integration and therefore support the de-globalisation hypothesis. However, these indicators will not be interpreted in isolation, as a decline in bilateral trade could reflect trade diversion to other countries rather than an overall reduction in global economic integration.

The quantitative analysis in the discussion uses data from the WTO Open Data platform for international and bilateral trade (World Trade Organisation, 2026). The WTO provides annual trade values by economy and country, as well as bilateral trade data, allowing changes in trading relationships to be examined closely. FDI inflow data is obtained from Macrotrends, which provides historical country-level FDI figures in US dollars. Academic literature and reports from international institutions are also used to provide qualitative evidence and establish the wider context of each trade conflict.

We decided that the case studies should be compared using the same indicators to identify similarities and differences in their effects on economic integration. Data from periods before and after each trade conflict was examined to determine whether trade, FDI and bilateral economic relationships changed following the introduction of trade restrictions. The results were then compared across the cases to assess whether trade wars and disputes consistently produce evidence of de-globalisation. Particular attention was given to whether falling bilateral trade is accompanied by increased trade with alternative partners, which could indicate restructuring of global value chains (Gereffi, Lim & Lee, 2021).

LIMITATIONS

However, there are several limitations to this methodology. Firstly, changes in trade and FDI cannot be linked entirely to trade wars because other factors, such as COVID-19, geopolitical tensions and changes in the countries’ economic policy, can affect these indicators (OECD, 2023). Secondly, the case studies differ in their causes, scale and duration, making direct comparisons difficult. Thirdly, FDI inflows can fluctuate significantly from year to year and may be influenced by factors unrelated to trade policy. Finally, a decline in bilateral trade does not necessarily demonstrate de-globalisation, as trade may simply shift towards alternative countries. Therefore, the findings will be used to assess the contribution of trade wars to de-globalisation and the extent of it, which seems less than expected.

Case Studies

For our case studies, we’ve found four examples which relate to our research question and how it contributes to de-globalisation through economic effects of fluctuating trade on both countries/economies. 

INDIA-US TRADE DISPUTE

India wanted to expand renewable energy while developing its domestic solar manufacturing industry and reducing reliance on imported solar equipment. To achieve this, India introduced Domestic Content Requirements (DCRs) under its National Solar Mission, requiring certain solar projects to use Indian-made cells and modules. The US argued that this discriminated against imported American products and challenged India at the WTO in 2013 (Lavanya, 2025). The dispute began in 2010, when India launched its solar mission. In 2013, the US requested WTO consultations against India’s rules, followed by a request for a WTO panel in 2014 after consultations failed. In 2016, the WTO panel supported the US position, and India was given a deadline in 2017 to implement the ruling. Further WTO proceedings took place in 2018 regarding India’s compliance and potential retaliation from the US.

The dispute had economic effects for both countries. Indian manufacturers gained preferential access to government-supported solar projects, while US solar exporters faced reduced access to the Indian market (Lavanya, 2025). The WTO found India’s measures inconsistent with WTO non-discrimination rules. The dispute also encouraged India to focus more heavily on domestic solar manufacturing rather than relying entirely on imported equipment, while the US sought to protect access for its solar manufacturers through WTO enforcement (Lavanya, 2025).

The dispute provides some evidence of de-globalisation because it demonstrates a shift away from pure cost-based global sourcing towards domestic production and supply-chain resilience. However, it is more accurately described as protectionism and localisation rather than definitive de-globalisation, because solar trade between the countries continued, along with trading of other goods.

RUSSIA-EU TRADE DISPUTE

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in the Ukraine crisis in 2014 led the EU to impose economic sanctions. The relationship also reflected wider geopolitical tensions and Russia’s increasing use of policies favouring domestic production. The EU imposed sanctions targeting areas including finance, energy and defence-related trade. Russia responded in August 2014 with a food embargo on agricultural and food products from countries supporting sanctions, including EU members. Russia also expanded import-substitution policies favouring domestic producers.

These measures had significant economic effects. EU-Russia trade fell sharply, with EU imports from Russia falling from €174.7 billion in 2014 to €130.3 billion in 2015, while EU exports fell from €99.1 billion to €70.5 billion. Total trade therefore fell by roughly 27% between 2014 and 2015. However, this decline cannot be attributed entirely to sanctions, as falling oil prices and the Russian economic downturn also played a major role. The trade restrictions also affected supply chains and encouraged both sides to find alternative trading partners. European exporters attempted to divert trade to alternative markets, while Russia increasingly redirected trade towards countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia also pursued import substitution, encouraging domestic production and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers.

This provides strong evidence of trade regionalisation and diversification, as political tensions disrupted established EU-Russia supply chains and encouraged both sides to seek alternative trading partners. However, it is better described as trade fragmentation and regionalisation rather than complete de-globalisation, because trade was redirected rather than simply disappearing.

US-CHINA TRADE WAR

The US and China trade war (2018-present) was based on complaints regarding China’s trade practices, including allegations of intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers and state subsidies to domestic companies. In 2016, Donald Trump repeatedly criticised China for exploiting trade agreements and promised to reduce the US’s trade deficit during his presidential campaign. Trump subsequently charged tariffs on Chinese imports ranging from steel and aluminium to consumer goods like electronics and clothing (Bekkers & Schroeter, 2020). China’s trade/supply chain response was retaliation, targeting American agricultural products such as soy beans, as well as industrial goods. 

This caused economic effects, leaving behind evidence of de-globalisation. By 2019, due to the rising cost of goods, the US had imposed tariffs over US$360 billion worth of Chinese goods with China on US$110 billion worth of American products (Fajgelbaum & Khandelwal, 2021). This caused uncertainty in global markets with many businesses left to assess the potential implications of higher costs and disrupted supply chains. Global supply chains, which have been deeply interconnected through decades of globalisation, were negatively impacted. Companies that relied on Chinese manufacturing or American consumers faced higher production costs and profit declines. This trade war affected not just the US and China but also emerging markets, especially those in Asia. Countries like Malaysia and Vietnam saw an increase of businesses looking to relocate production away from China to avoid tariffs (The Economist, 2019). This shift provided opportunities but also strained local infrastructure and labour markets. Additionally, countries dependent on exports to China, like Australia and Brazil, experienced economic slowdowns as Chinese demand for commodities decreased.

This first trade war created widespread disruption, with only select industries and countries emerging as winners. In the US, domestic steel manufacturers benefitted from tariffs on foreign competitors, but these gains were short-lived as retributive tariffs on America’s goods hurt other sectors. American farmers experienced substantial negative impacts as Chinese tariffs caused a major decline in agricultural exports. The Trump administration’s response was to provide billions of dollars in subsidies to make up the farmers’ losses, but these payments did very little compared to the long-term damage to US agriculture. Globally, countries such as India, Mexico and Vietnam benefitted from the diversion of trade and investment (Economic Growth Centre, 2024). As companies searched for alternatives to China, these nations saw the increase in foreign direct investment and expanded their manufacturing and production capacity. However, such changes underlined the weakness of globalisation, as businesses were forced to reconsider the rising risks of trade policy and over-reliance on any other country.

JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA TRADE CONFLICT

It’s important to recognise unique factors at play during the Japan-South Korea trade conflict (2019-2023). For Japan, the collapse of global supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019 was particularly notable (Mao & Görg, 2020). For example, if domestic companies with production bases in China were unable to produce their products due to the impact of the global pandemic, then it would also be a significant blow to the Japanese economy. Simultaneously, for South Korea, during COVID-19, political conflicts surfaced between the South Korean and Japanese governments over the issue of wartime labourers during the period of Japanese colonial ruling, which escalated into conflicts in the fields of economy and security.

The Japan-South Korea trade conflict was triggered by South Korean court rulings ordering Japanese firms to compensate wartime forced labourers (BBC, 2019). Japan reacted by restricting semiconductor chemical exports and removing South Korea from its preferential trade “white list”. This caused trade measures in which Japan restricted high-tech exports to South Korea and removed it from its white list of trusted trade partners (Shin & Balistreri, 2022). South Korea responded by taking similar actions in which they removed Japan from their own preferential trade list and filed a formal complaint with the WTO (Shin & Balistreri, 2022).

In the 1990s, South Korea’s semiconductor industry became reliant on Japan for supplies, and Japan became dependent on demand from South Korea (Kim, 2024). This proved beneficial to both countries and increased the costs and risks associated with reducing that interdependence. With the inability to import semiconductor materials from Japan, selling productions of semiconductors both domestically and abroad was pushed into a crisis. This conflict contributed to de-globalisation by proving that trusted trade partners could weaponise supply chains for political retaliation. This broke the free-market assumption that significant components would always flow freely which forces nations to prioritise economic nationalism, self-reliance and supply chain localisation over global efficiency.

Evaluation

The results from the four case studies provide partial support for our hypothesis that trade wars and disputes contribute to de-globalisation. Across the case studies, there was a general decline in bilateral trade between the countries involved, which is particularly visible in the US-China trade war. China’s bilateral trade share with the US decreased from approximately 13% in 2018 to 11% in 2024, whilst the USA’s bilateral trade share with China decreased from approximately 15.7% to 13%. Similarly, Russia’s bilateral trade share with the EU decreased by 5% between 2013-17. We concluded that these changes suggest that trade disputes weaken economic relationships between countries. This supports our argument that trade wars and conflicts may contribute to global economic fragmentation of global supply chains (Gereffi, Lim & Lee, 2021). 

Gereffi, Lim and Lee (2021) explain that trade policies can cause firms to adapt and restructure their global value chains by changing supply locations and trading partners. This is particularly relevant to our research because the purpose of measuring bilateral trade was to determine whether countries became less economically connected following a trade dispute. Our findings suggest that this did occur to some extent, as bilateral trade declined across our case studies. However, this does not necessarily mean that countries stopped trading globally.

The strongest evidence against complete de-globalisation comes from comparing bilateral trade with trade as a percentage of GDP. For example, China’s trade as a percentage of GDP increased slightly from approximately 36% in 2018 to 37% in 2024, despite its bilateral trade share with the US declining. Similarly, Russia’s trade as a percentage of GDP remained approximately 51% before and after its tensions with the EU, despite its bilateral trade share with the EU falling from approximately 48% to 43%. This suggests that countries can become less dependent on a particular trading partner without becoming less integrated into the global economy overall.

This supports the findings of Fajgelbaum et al. (2024), who found that the US-China trade war led to changes in trade patterns and increased the export opportunities for countries outside the US and China. Therefore, some trade that was previously conducted between the US and China may have been redirected towards other countries, like Mexico and Vietnam (Freund et al., 2024), rather than disappearing completely. This means that our results are more consistent with restructuring or fragmentation of global trade than complete de-globalisation (World Trade Organisation, n.d.).

The FDI results also provide mixed evidence. India, Japan and the US experienced increases in FDI inflows after their respective disputes, whilst Russia, South Korea and China experienced decreases. For example, India’s FDI inflows increased from approximately $28.15 billion in 2013 to $44.46 billion in 2016, despite the decline in its trade-to-GDP ratio. This suggests that the solar dispute was not directly associated with India becoming generally less attractive for foreign investors, even though FDI is indeed influenced by a variety of domestic and global factors. In contrast, Russia’s FDI inflows decreased from approximately $53 billion to $28 billion between 2013 and 2017, which is consistent with the reduction of economic integration internationally. Thus, providing stronger evidence of reduced international economic integration.

However, the FDI results need to be treated carefully because FDI can be affected by many factors unrelated to trade wars. Changes in economic growth, government policy, political stability and investor confidence can all influence investment flows. Therefore, the FDI data cannot independently demonstrate that a trade war caused de-globalisation.

Another important finding is that the scale and nature of each dispute affected the results differently. The India-US solar dispute was relatively limited and focused on solar technology and domestic-content requirements, whereas the US-China trade war involved much larger economies and extensive tariffs across multiple sectors. The Russia-EU tensions were also strongly connected to geopolitical developments, showing that economic integration can be affected by political relationships as well as traditional trade policy. The Japan-South Korea dispute similarly involved strategic supply chains and therefore demonstrates how countries may attempt to reduce dependence on particular suppliers.

The COVID-19 pandemic is another important factor when interpreting our results. In particular, the Japan-South Korea figures use 2020 as the post-dispute period, meaning that the reduction in trade and FDI cannot be attributed entirely to the trade dispute. The pandemic caused widespread disruption to global supply chains and international trade, meaning it is difficult to separate its effects from those of the trade conflict.

Overall, our findings suggest that trade wars have contributed to greater bilateral fragmentation, but there is weaker evidence that they have caused overall de-globalisation. This distinction is important because a country reducing its trade with one particular partner does not necessarily mean it is reducing its participation in the global economy. Instead, countries may replace trading partners, diversify their supply chains or increase regional trade. This is consistent with Zahoor et al. (2023), who argue that protectionism can lead to the reconfiguration of global value chains rather than simply their disappearance. Therefore, the evidence suggests that our hypothesis should be partially accepted. Trade wars have contributed to countries becoming less dependent on particular trading partners and have encouraged greater supply-chain resilience and economic security. However, the evidence does not show that these disputes have independently caused widespread de-globalisation. Instead, they appear to be contributing to a wider process of economic fragmentation and restructuring of globalisation.

Conclusion

This research investigated to what extent major trade wars since 2013 have contributed to de-globalisation and global economic fragmentation. The paper examined four case studies and quantitative measurements of trade as a percentage of GDP, bilateral trade and FDI inflows, alongside qualitative evidence to support our argument. Overall, the evidence suggests that major trade wars post-2013 have only contributed to de-globalisation to a limited extent, primarily through the reduction of bilateral economic integration and the restructuring of the global supply chains due to the trade wars. 

The strongest evidence came from the bilateral trade data, which generally showed declining trade relationships between the countries involved in the disputes, as the reduction in trade between two countries does not directly indicate a decrease in their participation in the global economy. This supports the argument that tariffs, trade restrictions and retaliation can weaken economic relationships and encourage countries to reduce their dependence on particular trading partners.

However, our other indicators produced more mixed results, suggesting that trade wars may not necessarily reduce global trade and instead lead to changes in the overall direction and the structure of the current ongoing international trade. Trade as a percentage of GDP did not consistently decline, and FDI inflows increased in some countries while decreasing in others. This suggests that trade wars do not necessarily cause countries to withdraw from the global economy. Instead, trade and investment may be redirected towards other countries. Research by Fajgelbaum et al. (2024) supports this, showing that the US-China trade war contributed to the reallocation of trade towards other economies.

Therefore, our hypothesis is only partially supported. Trade wars have contributed to economic fragmentation by reducing bilateral economic ties and encouraging countries to reconsider their supply chains and trading partners. However, the evidence suggests trade wars’ contribution to de-globalisation is very limited. Countries may reduce their trade dependency on fixed partners and instead trade with other countries. 

The research also demonstrates that trade wars are not the only factor contributing to changes in global economic integration. COVID-19, geopolitical tensions and changes in national economic policies have also influenced trade and investment. This makes it difficult to isolate the exact impact of individual trade disputes, suggesting that the findings should be interpreted as pieces of evidence that show trade wars contribute to a wider global economic fragmentation, rather than as the sole cause of changes in the global economy.

Ultimately, our research suggests that globalisation is not necessarily being reversed, but is instead being restructured (Zahoor et al., 2023; OECD, 2024). Countries are becoming more cautious about their dependence on individual trading partners and strategically important supply chains. Therefore, the current global economy may be better described as becoming more fragmented and regionally organised, rather than simply becoming less globalised.

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