Should the government have the authority to access an individual citizen’s cell phone and private messages in the interest of citizen protection? 

Abstract

The undeniable rapid growth of digital communication and social media usage worldwide has raised many concerns regarding how governments might be able to keep their citizens safe while also respecting privacy and freedom of expression. The main question our research tries to answer is: Does European Union’s “Chat Control” proposal protect citizens or violate their right to privacy? (Marit, 2026) This also raises the question of whether governments should have the right to parse through a citizen’s phone and/or private messages if national security and public safety are concerned. The qualitative research carried out in this study includes EU proposals, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and cases in European courts regarding human rights and government surveillance in European countries. It will compare arguments for monitoring a citizen’s phone with arguments regarding privacy, encryption policies, freedom of expression and government overreach. The research argues that protecting citizens and children from serious risks is a legitimate government responsibility, but surveillance should be effective, proportionate and subject to  strong legal protections. It is a part of a larger debate of how democratic governments will respond to current and future digital threats while still protecting fundamental rights.

Introduction

How much government surveillance of private communications can be justified as a public safety measure before it becomes an intrusion of privacy? Digital communication has become one of the most essential aspects of modern living and the way people all over the world interact with each other. People interact with each other through social media, text messages, emails, and private messaging apps, which all house enormous amounts of data that can be traced back through the internet. Communication has shifted to the digital space and for many, the internet is one of the main ways of communicating with and engaging in society.

Citizens have fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of expression that can be threatened when governments are given broad powers to monitor these digital communications. This conflict has become  particularly important in the European Union with the proposed Regulation to Prevent and Combat  Child Sexual Abuse, often referred to as “Chat Control”. The proposal was created in response to the serious problem of child sexual abuse material and exploitation occurring through online platforms. While protecting children is an important responsibility of governments, parts of the  proposal have caused controversy because of concerns that detecting illegal material could require private digital communications to be looked at and scanned. This raises questions about encrypted messaging, government surveillance and whether measures designed for public safety could eventually interfere with the privacy of millions of citizens. The controversy surrounding chat control is therefore about more than one piece of European legislation. It represents a larger debate about how fundamental rights should apply in an increasingly digital society. International and European human rights protections recognise both privacy and freedom of expression, while governments are also expected to protect their populations from crime and serious threats.  Determining where one responsibility ends and another begins becomes especially complicated when private digital communication is involved.  

Most people nowadays do most of their talking through a screen. Telephone calls and face-to-face conversations are still happening, of course, but the most common way of keeping in touch, checking in with family, making plans, falling out and making up, and passing on news has moved almost entirely onto messaging apps and social media. The scale of this massive shift is easy to underestimate. By late 2025, more than six billion people were online, close to three-quarters of the entire world population, and well over three billion of them were using at least one messaging service [DataReportal, 2025]. WhatsApp alone passed three billion monthly users and now carries more than a hundred billion messages a day, and that is without even counting Messenger, Instagram, Telegram, iMessage and the rest [Business of Apps, 2026]. Similarly, news is read and argued over on social media, businesses reach their customers online, campaigns are run and protests are being organised, and even public bodies now push their announcements and services through the same apps. The average user spends hours on these apps every single day [DataReportal, 2025]. What began as a novelty has become the basic wiring of public life, the place where a large share of what a society does is now said, shared and stored. Any question about who can see inside these platforms is therefore not a  narrow technical one; it reaches almost everything that modern life runs on. 

This has also quietly changed what a private conversation is. Things that used to be said out loud, in a room where only the people present could hear them, are now typed and sent. The private conversation has become a private message. A teenager works through a problem with a friend over text instead of in a school corridor; two people arrange to meet, gossip about a third, or share something they would never say in public, all inside a chat window. What has not changed is the expectation that comes with it: people assume a message meant for one person stays between the two of them.

This is exactly what makes the shift so difficult for governments. The tools that keep an ordinary person’s messages private also shelter the people using them to cause real harm. Organised crime groups plan and coordinate over encrypted group chats [Europol, 2020]; extremist networks recruit and organise  across borders on the same platforms families use to send birthday photos [Europol, 2025]; and material documenting the sexual abuse of children is passed through private channels that the companies running them cannot see [WeProtect Global Alliance, 2025]. European police forces have a name for the effect all this has on their work: “going dark” [EDRi, 2024]. As more communication slips behind encryption, the space in which investigators  can lawfully gather evidence keeps shrinking. In April 2024, a group of European police chiefs said as much, warning that privacy measures such as end-to-end encryption prevent technology companies from identifying and reporting offences, and pointing to terrorism, child sexual abuse and human trafficking as the areas where investigations are hit hardest [eucrim, 2024].

A government has a genuine duty to investigate serious crime, and it cannot simply accept that offenders now hide inside the same apps everyone else lives in. However, the obvious fix, building a way to look inside private messages, runs into a hard  problem: you cannot open a window into a few suspects’ conversations without also building the means to open one into everybody’s. This is where this paper begins, and it can be put as a single question: “How can a government investigate genuine threats to its citizens without treating the private communications of those same citizens as something it is entitled to monitor?” This is a legal question before it is a technical one, and this paper answers it as a matter of  European law. The place where the tension is sharpest right now is a single piece of legislation: the European Union’s proposed regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse, the measure that its critics are calling “Chat Control” [COM, 2022]. In its most contested form it would allow authorities to order a messaging service to search its users’ communications for illegal material, and it would do so even where those communications are end-to-end encrypted, which in practice means scanning messages on the user’s own device before they are sent. The proposal is the clearest example yet of a government trying to build exactly the window this paper is concerned with, and it is the case study around which the argument is built. 

This proposed regulation directly runs into the body of European law that already protects private communication: the confidentiality of communications promised by the ePrivacy Directive [ECtHR, 1998], the rules on processing personal data in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990] and, standing over both of them, the rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the European Union and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012]. These are the instruments this paper works with, and the question of whether a general power to look inside private messages can survive them is, in the end, a question about proportionality: whether a measure that reaches into everyone’s communications in order to catch a few offenders is a  necessary and proportionate way to pursue an aim that is itself entirely legitimate. 

The paper makes its case in three parts. It first sets out the state’s side, taking seriously the duty to investigate the terrorism, organised crime and child sexual abuse described above and the real ways in which encryption makes that work difficult. It then looks at what a power to access encrypted communications requires in technical terms, and why a mechanism built to reach a few suspects cannot be contained. Finally, it holds the proposed measures up against the fundamental-rights framework and its proportionality test and argues that a general obligation to scan or weaken private communications cannot be reconciled with Articles 7 and 8, and that the state’s genuine investigative needs must instead be met through targeted, independently authorised measures that leave the security of everyone else’s communications intact.

Government Responsibilities in the Context of Chat Control

The government, in the context of the newly introduced chat control, is faced with two issues that are often seen as contradictory to each other. On the one hand, it is faced with the challenge of protecting the privacy of individuals and their lives; on the other hand, it is a positive obligation that they assume to provide safety for children or other civilians and members of communities who are more prone to being targeted by predators and other criminal or harmful actors. These two main factors are the responsibilities of the government in the context of chat control and are the main subjects that will be discussed here. As a side note, we add that the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) have been significant  in working around the subject of chat control and child safety, making them two of the most important actors in understanding the responsibilities of the government in recent years.

The government is faced with maintaining a difficult balance between its obligation to protect individuals and its obligation to respect their right to privacy, and this matters just as much in the eyes of the law. In Osman v United Kingdom, the Court recognised the government’s positive obligation to take reasonable measures to protect individuals’ lives from real and immediate threats [EHRR, 1998]. Furthermore, under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to respect for private and family life extends to private correspondence and therefore considers whether state surveillance measures unjustifiably interfere with the privacy protections afforded by Article 8. In Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights considered the UK’s mass surveillance programme and its impact on privacy and freedom of expression, which collected data and private information on people’s private lives, causing them to become more cautious about what they say or how they communicate [EctHR, 2021]. The  European Court of Human Rights ruled that this broke the law, given that they did not hold enough rules in the first place to stop the government from misusing that power; it violated both the right to privacy of Article 8 and the right to free expression in Article 10. 

The other side of this complex question is the protection of children and others who may be more vulnerable to predators and threats. Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states ‘the best interest of the child shall be primary consideration’. This supports the idea that  protecting children from threats such as grooming and abuse is an important responsibility for the government, however the existence of this rule does not necessarily mean that every measure used to protect children is valid. This raises questions about whether chat control protects children while also protecting people’s privacy. The European Commission itself acknowledges the limited evidence of the effectiveness of chat control [Breyer, 2025], which raises questions about whether such measures are necessary and proportionate. 

The debate over chat control ultimately comes down to determining if the government and the EU can fulfil their protective duty to protect children and vulnerable groups while also respecting the privacy of individuals. The positive obligation seen in Osman demonstrates the importance of preventing serious harm, but this obligation has to be seen alongside the rights that are protected by Article 8 and Article 10. Big Brother Watch demonstrates that the European Court of Human Rights may need stronger safeguarding where surveillance interferes with people’s privacy and freedom of expression and thought. Yet amidst this debated subject, many people are still not very aware of what chat control fully is, raising the question: what is, in reality, chat control?

What is Chat Control and How Does It Affect Us?

In May 2022, the European Commission proposed the Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR), which would create a permanent system for digital service providers to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material (CSAM) from their services [COM, 2022]. It is known as “Chat Control” by its critics because the detection order mechanism would require providers to scan for known CSAM, use AI to detect previously unknown material and flag grooming conversations – something technologists say is impossible without breaking end-to-end encryption [European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022]. Supporters of the measure note that voluntary scanning already accounts for up to 99% of EU CSAM reports and results in four of five resulting investigations [EU Perspectives, 2026], while critics of the system point to a 13-20% false-positive rate. Additionally, German police show findings that nearly half of flagged reports were criminally irrelevant, with roughly 40% of suspects themselves being minors [State of Surveillance, 2026].

The extent of this issue cannot be overstated. Europol reported some 725,000 CSAM reports in 2019 and 1 million in 2020, while in 2024, the EU reported more than 20.5 million, of which AI-generated content alone saw an increase of over 1,300% in a single year [Europol 2022]. Nonetheless, the vast majority of electronic service providers have yet to start scanning and reporting proactively. EU communications are entitled to protection under Article 5 of the ePrivacy Directive, the GDPR, and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights , which collectively imply that there cannot be any monitoring without a specific legal basis [GDPR, 2016; CFR, 2012]. Only voluntary scanning has been considered legally permissible due to several derogations, temporarily, with the latest being Regulation (EU) 2026/1881, valid until April 2028 unless a permanent legal framework supersedes it earlier. The government has a reciprocal responsibility in this matter. The state is required to safeguard its citizens from dangers that are known to it. In KU v Finland, it was argued that the state’s positive obligation under Article 8 may mean that the state must set up a framework that can identify people who use the internet to harm children, especially when the authorities have the tools or should have the tools to do so [ECtHR, 2008]. In the case of chat control, applying this principle makes it a clear duty of the government, even though the case was about a failure to allow identification of the offender rather than a direct duty to stop online grooming.  

This must yield to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, enshrined by way of the Human Rights Act 1998, providing for the protection of privacy and correspondence, including  digital correspondence, against unlawful and unnecessary interference in a democratic society. In Big Brother Watch and Others v United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber ruled that a large-scale  interception programme violated Articles 8 and 10 due to its absence of independent authorisation and safeguards against potential abuse. Massive monitoring is not inherently illegal; however, it  cannot be achieved without those safeguards, just like any other chat control system. Here, encryption comes into play as a means of protecting journalists’ sources, banking systems and  infrastructure, and the European Data Protection Board pointed out that client-side scanning cannot be deployed without creating weaknesses exploitable by third parties. Thus, organisations such as Signal are willing to leave the EU rather than implement this technology [Human Rights Act, 1998; ECtHR, 2021]. Together, Osman and Big Brother Watch provide an opposing perspective on the matter: the state is required to take action after becoming aware of the threat children are facing; yet it needs to earn the right to do it on a larger scale first by providing the guarantees that are already required by the Convention, while chat control is still lacking that.

Balancing Public Safety and the Right to Privacy

When governments interfere with fundamental rights such as privacy, there are legal requirements that must be met for that interference to be justified. Under European human rights law, an interference must have a legitimate purpose, be necessary and be proportionate to the threat or problem being addressed. A legitimate purpose means that the government is acting toward a recognised public interest, such as preventing crime or protecting the rights and safety of others. Necessity considers whether the interference is actually needed to achieve that purpose, while proportionality considers whether the impact on individual rights is justified by the benefit the policy is intended to provide. These requirements are important when considering the EU’s Chat  Control proposal because its purpose of protecting children may be legitimate, but that alone does not mean that every method used to achieve this goal is legally justified. 

Supporters of chat control argue that traditional investigations are no longer enough because offenders can take advantage of private digital services and hide illegal activity. From this perspective, waiting until authorities already have evidence against a particular suspect could mean that harmful content remains undetected and children remain at risk. This is one of the strongest arguments in favour of the proposal because the purpose is to prevent harm rather than simply respond after it has already happened. Governments cannot ignore serious crimes simply because they take place through private technology. However, accepting that governments need effective investigative powers does not mean that every method of surveillance is justified. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) raised this concern in their joint opinion on the proposal, stating that it could be the basis for “generalised and indiscriminate scanning” of electronic communications [EDPB, 2022]. Their criticism shows that the debate is not simply between people who want to protect children and people who want privacy; instead, the disagreement is about what governments should be permitted to do in order to achieve that protection.

A more proportionate approach would focus government powers on individuals, accounts or groups where there is evidence of serious criminal activity. The European Parliament has movd  towards this type of approach in its position on the regulation, supporting targeted detection orders where there are actually reasonable grounds for suspicion rather than allowing just general monitoring [European Parliament, 2023]. Targeting surveillance would not remove the government’s ability to investigate  serious crimes; instead, it would create a threshold that authorities would have to meet before interfering with somebody’s private communications. Independent authorisation could also require authorities to explain why surveillance is necessary, what information they are seeking and how long the investigation should continue. These limits would make it more difficult for systems meant to deal with one serious purpose to be used in situations where they weren’t originally intended. 

This distinction is important because government surveillance often involves a thin line between security and individual freedom. If authorities are given too little power, they may struggle to investigate genuine threats. If they are given extremely broad powers, however, innocent citizens can become part of that surveillance system even though there’s no evidence or any reason for them to be a part of it. The solution should therefore not be to completely prevent governments from accessing digital communications, but to establish a high standard for when that interference is justified. 

Ultimately, governments may need to interfere with private digital communications when responding to serious threats, but this power must have clear limits. Surveillance should be targeted, supported by evidence and independently monitored rather than applied broadly to protect citizens without interfering with the fundamental rights that European law is designed to protect. 

Online Child Protection and the Right to Privacy Online

The proposed regulation is intended to prevent and combat child sexual abuse online by placing responsibilities on online providers to identify and report suspected abuse [COM, 2022]. The main goal of the regulation is to improve online safety and protect children from exploitation. However, the proposal also raises concerns about the security and privacy of private communication, as this could affect how securely individuals communicate online [European Commission, 2000]. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights protects several rights that are important when considering these security measures. Article  7 protects the right to respect for private and family life, including communications, while Article 8 protects individuals’ personal data and requires it to be processed fairly for specified purposes and on a legitimate legal basis [CFR, 2000]. Article 11 also protects freedom of expression and the right to receive and share information. These rights are important when considering measures that could involve the monitoring or scanning of private communications. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights also protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. Although this right can be subject to certain restrictions, such restrictions must meet legal requirements and be necessary in a democratic society for legitimate purposes. Therefore, although the regulation has the legitimate goal of protecting children from online abuse,  it must also balance this goal with the rights of individuals to privacy, data protection, secure communication and freedom of expression. This balance is important when considering how the regulation could affect the security of online communication and the fundamental rights protected under European law.  

Another important concern is how the regulation could affect encrypted communication. Encryption is important because it helps protect the confidentiality and security of private communications by preventing unauthorised parties from accessing information. This is particularly relevant to the rights protected under European law, as private communication is connected to the protection of individual privacy and personal data. If communication platforms are required to scan private messages, this could weaken the security that encryption provides and increase concerns about who may have access to private information and how that information would be handled [Council of the EU, 2026]. At the same time, the purpose of these measures is to detect harmful content and protect children from online abuse, which makes the issue more complicated. European law allows certain restrictions on individual rights when there is a legitimate reason, but these restrictions must be justified and proportionate to the goal they are trying to achieve [CFR, 2000]. Therefore, the legal concern is not only whether the regulation can help protect children, but whether the methods used to achieve this goal interfere with privacy and secure communication more than is necessary. This creates a need to balance child protection with the protection of fundamental rights and the security of online communication.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper set out to examine whether the EU Chat Control proposal protects citizens or violates their rights to privacy. The research concludes that both sides of the debate hold their points and that in recent years no one has been able to fully determine whether chat control is ultimately a good idea. On one hand, cases like Osman v UK and KU v Finland confirm that governments hold an obligation to protect people, including children,  from any threats, and that extends to the digital world too. On the other hand, Big Brother Watch and Others v United Kingdom demonstrates that large scale interference with private communications violates Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights when it lacks independent authorisation and proper safeguards against abuse. 

Knowing these two main ideas helps define the main issue of chat control: the initial proposal of  protecting children from online exploitation, this idea is legitimate, but its generalised scanning method is not completely justified only because the goal is overlooked as ‘correct’. The concept of allowing chat control to have generalised access to private information also allows access to everyone, including threats such as criminals and hackers, allowing an opening in the security of national or/and international databases. The European Data Protection Board’s own warnings about ‘generalised and indiscriminate scanning,’ combined with the European Commission’s limited evidence that chat control could and is actually working, reinforces concern. 

The more workable path forward, supported by the European Parliament’s own proposition, is targeted surveillance based on reasonable suspicion rather than general monitoring of the entire  population. This would preserve the government’s ability to investigate genuine threats while respecting their privacy under Article 8. Ultimately, protecting children and protecting privacy are not opposite goals and achieving both requires surveillance that is targeted and evidence-based, which is precisely what the Chat Control proposal has yet to demonstrate.

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