To what extent has the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) addressed the treatment of women within criminal justice and detention systems in India and the UK?

Abstract

International law has historically developed around a narrow conception of the state as the primary subject of legal obligation, leaving gendered harm under-addressed. Although there have been multiple developments of frameworks laws around women in criminal justice within, it has been uneven. Instruments such as the Convention on Elimination of all forms of  Discrimination Against Women 1979 (CEDAW) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) were each designed to advance protection against discrimination, yet neither directly addresses the issue of vulnerabilities faced by women in detention. Despite it heavily focusing on gender-based discrimination, the CEDAW has no clear provisions with respect to women’s imprisonment. The ICCPR’s guarantee of humane treatment in criminal justice, in Article 10, uses gender-neutral terms, overlooking women’s  distinct needs. The UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners (the Bangkok Rules, 2010) were created specifically to address this issue. However, the legal document remains non-binding, and its implementation depends on the state’s discretion. This paper accentuates the resulting gap between the intended aim of these frameworks and its practical reach, where protection for women in detention sites often varies with interpretation and culture rather than binding text. This reflects what Charlesworth and Chinkin describe as international law’s male default design, where frameworks are built without women’s needs and expectations in mind and within a male-dominant design. The research furthermore uses case law referencing, with close reading of Abramova v Belarus [LSE, 2011] (CEDAW Communication No. 23/2009) as the primary working authority demonstrating how the Committee has extended CEDAW’s reach into detention despite textual silence. A comparative case-study method then examines India and the UK, contrasting India’s more monist-leaning judicial engagement with international treaties with the UK’s strict dualism, using National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data, the Model Prison Manual, the Corston Report 2007, the Female Offender Strategy 2018 and the CEDAW Concluding Observations. The paper argues that ratification alone does not ensure protection; domestic incorporation mechanisms and underlying social drivers are decisive. It contributes a comparative account of how CEDAW’s criminal-justice blind spot is patched unevenly across two legal systems.

Introduction

Globally, there are 733,000 women in prison, an increase of 57% in the past 24 years, a number that’s still increasing at a faster rate than men in prisons [Penal Reform International, n.d.]. Yet, women constitute only 7% of the global population of prisoners [Penal Reform International, n.d.]. This gives rise to an important question for international laws regarding women in criminal justice. If women make up a relatively small percentage of the total prisoners in the world, are the existing safeguards against discrimination sufficient or an excuse for overlooking them? The issue gains transparency when detention of women is viewed not merely as the loss of liberty, but an experience woven through gender. Women in  detention often face harm due to being women like inadequate provision of reproductive healthcare, invasive searches, gender-based violence, rape and limited recourse and rehabilitation for custodial violence against women. These experiences also illustrate the significance of state power, understood here as the authority exercised by governments and  their institutions over individuals, including the power to deprive a person of liberty. The problem, therefore, does not merely invite extensive protection, but points towards improving regulations around how gender shapes women’s experiences within institutions of state control, as conditions of prison are a state responsibility.

A major reason for this limitation to exist can be associated with the broader structure of  international law, which is state-centric. The majority of the legal protections have focused on curbing arbitrary use of state power through rights such as equality, liberty, security and freedom from torture. Although this structure has played a fundamental role in establishing international human rights protections, it has paved the way for individual rights-holders to be  treated as largely gender-neutral. As a consequence, rules may appear equal on the surface but can still lead to gendered harm, meaning harm that arises specifically because of an individual’s gender. A prison policy usually applies consistently to men and women; historically prisons have been filled by men therefore prison policies and manuals assumed men as a category; this fails to account for differences in healthcare, reproductive needs, family responsibilities or exposure to gender-based violence. The contrasting ideas of formal equality, where individuals are treated in the same way, and substantive equality, where law considers the different effects of treatment, are at the centre of this paper’s argument. This distinction is particularly important when assessing the extent to which laws protect female prisoners, as formally equal laws may fail to address the distinct needs and disadvantages experienced by women within the criminal justice and detention systems. 

We argue that the laws relating to criminal justice and women have made instrumental progress to optimise substantive equality. For example, the implementation of Convention on Elimination of all forms of  Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 provided a comprehensive definition of discrimination in Article 1 and detailed legalities regarding education, marriage, employment, health, workplace and rural women’s rights [CEDAW, 1981]. However, the CEDAW contains no provisions addressing women’s imprisonment or the conditions of their detention. Thus, specific experiences of women will only be addressed retroactively, when existing frameworks are found not to reach them [Charlesworth & Chinkin, 2000]. This further exemplifies the unevenness.

This gap is not unique to the CEDAW. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), under Article 10(1), guarantees that all persons deprived of their right to liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person [ICCPR, 1976]. The  striking limitation here is that the provision embodies a gender-neutral language, providing no content specific to women’s needs in custody. To address this, the UN General Assembly in 2010 adopted the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners, known as the Bangkok Rules [Penal Reform International, n.d.]. Yet, the Bangkok Rules remain non-binding soft law, dependent on voluntary state adoption, with no enforcement mechanism like the CEDAW’s Optional Protocol [OHCHR, n.d.].

Across all three instruments, a clear structural gap is evident. None of them provide a binding force on rules made specially for women prisoners. While the CEDAW and ICCPR are binding on states, they provide generalised terms for women prisoners. On the other hand, the Bangkok Rules provide an extensive text for women prisoners but remain non-binding. Therefore, this paper argues that the international law framework has failed to provide consistent protection for  women in the criminal justice system, more specifically those imprisoned by law. By comparing criminal justice systems in India and the UK, the paper will argue that domestic mechanisms through which a state embodies international obligations, together with underlying  social conditions, shape women’s experience with the justice system, offering little reassurance of protection in practice.

Methodology

This section sets out the analytical standard used throughout the paper, substantive equality, and traces its theoretical basis before applying it to CEDAW, the ICCPR and the Bangkok Rules. 

The starting point is the distinction between formal and substantive equality. Formal equality, drawn from the Aristotelian maxim that likes should be treated alike, holds that women and men ought to receive identical treatment: the same rules, the same facilities, the same entitlements, regardless of sex [Aristotle, c. 350 BC]. Its attraction is its apparent neutrality. A rule that does not mention gender cannot, on its face, be said to discriminate on that ground. The difficulty is that formal equality treats women and men as though they occupy the same starting position, so identical treatment is assumed to produce identical outcomes. It cannot see the ways that assumption fails. Where women’s circumstances differ materially through physical realities such as pregnancy, through distinct risks such as vulnerability to sexual violence, or through social roles such as primary caregiving, identical treatment does not remove disadvantage. It leaves it standing, just unnamed. 

Substantive equality developed in response to this. Rather than asking whether a rule applies equally on its face, it asks whether the rule produces equal outcomes once applied, and it accepts that this may require differentiated, rather than identical, treatment. Sandra Fredman’s work has been particularly influential here. She proposes that substantive equality be understood across four dimensions: redressing disadvantage; addressing stigma, prejudice and  violence; enhancing participation and voice; and accommodating difference through structural  change [Fredman, 2016]. Her account is useful because it moves the discussion beyond a single test, such as equality of outcome or equality of opportunity, and treats substantive equality instead as something assessed across several interacting dimensions of a person’s circumstances. This matters directly for women in detention, where disadvantages, stigma and physical difference are rarely separable from one another. 

The CEDAW Committee draws a closely related distinction in General Recommendation No. 25, stating that a purely formal legal or programmatic approach is insufficient to secure women’s de facto equality with men, and that the Convention’s underlying aim is this de facto, or substantive, equality [CEDAW, 2004]. Article 4(1) of CEDAW, which permits temporary special measures, gives legal expression to the same idea [CEDAW, 1981]. Differentiated treatment is not a departure from equality on this account; it is one of the means of achieving it. 

This theoretical foundation shapes how the paper approaches its three primary instruments. The CEDAW, the ICCPR and the Bangkok Rules are each considered not simply for whether they extend coverage to women, which each does in some form, but for whether they are capable of producing substantive, rather than merely formal, equality within the specific institutional setting of detention. This assessment proceeds through doctrinal legal research, examining the text of each instrument on its own terms, and through a comparative method, testing how the same underlying gap is addressed, or left unaddressed, once these instruments meet two different domestic legal systems. It analyses the text of these instruments alongside relevant case law, together with a feminist method informed by Charlesworth and Chinkin’s account of international law’s male default design, before testing these findings against domestic legal sources in India and the United Kingdom [Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, 1991][Charlesworth & Chinkin, 2001].

International Law on Female Prisoners

The CEDAW’s starting point presents an apparent gap. Article 1 provides a broad definition of  discrimination against women, defining discrimination as distinctions, exclusions or restrictions made on the basis of sex that impair or nullify women’s enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms [Justice Committee, 2013]. However, the Convention’s substantive provisions do not expressly identify detention, imprisonment or criminal justice as areas requiring gender equality protections.  

This omission matters because Article 1 is not self-executing in every possible factual situation. It is to be read as a guiding right that explains the other specific rights. Although its definition of discrimination is broad, the Convention’s detailed provisions largely focus on areas such as political participation, education, employment, healthcare and family relations. The absence of a dedicated criminal justice provision means that the specific experiences of women as detainees and prisoners were not directly anticipated within the treaty’s original architecture.  

The Bangkok Rules were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2010 and are not part of the CEDAW [CEDAW, 1981]. They constitute a separate UN soft-law instrument, although the CEDAW Committee uses international standards such as the Bangkok Rules when interpreting states’ obligations concerning women in detention. The importance of the Bangkok Rules is significant. First, they demonstrate that the international community eventually recognised that gender-neutral prison standards were insufficient. Secondly, their existence highlights the limitations of the CEDAW itself. If the CEDAW had expressly incorporated detention and the specific  needs of women prisoners, a separate instrument of this kind might have had a different function or would not have to exist. Instead, the Bangkok Rules effectively supplement the Convention’s silence. The strongest demonstration of this interpretive process is Abramova v Belarus, Communication No. 23/2009 [LSE, 2011]. Abramova, a journalist, was arrested after hanging protest ribbons and was held for five days in administrative detention. During detention, she experienced treatment including sexual harassment and threats in a facility staffed by men. The judgment from the case affirmed that state obligations under CEDAW extend to ensuring gender-sensitive detention conditions and protecting women from degrading, sex-specific mistreatment by law enforcement. 

The case therefore concerned not merely the fact of detention but the gendered conditions under which detention occurred. The development of General Recommendations alongside the Bangkok Rules and the Committee’s decision in Abramova v Belarus, demonstrates that the CEDAW has been capable of extending its protection to women within criminal justice and detention despite the absence of an express provision. However, this raises a fundamental  question: is it fair and legally sufficient for such an important area of women’s rights to depend upon interpretation and soft law rather than being expressly protected within the Convention itself? 

Ratifying the Law, Reproducing the Framework

International law provides little available protections which are fragmented such as the CEDAW, rhe ICCPR and the Bangkok rules. Many of the specific standards like healthcare, pregnancy, family contact and gender-responsive treatment concerning women prisoners are constructed through interpretive mechanisms and soft law rather than through explicit, universally-binding treaty provisions. This reveals a gap between what the law promises and what it can realistically deliver. Interpretation allows international law to adapt existing principles of equality, non-discrimination and human dignity to the particular experiences of  incarcerated women, while soft law can establish detailed standards that treaties may not contain. 

Case Study: India

India reveals the limits of international law most clearly when the question shifts from whether women’s rights are recognised to whether those rights are truly protected. Women’s incarceration cannot be treated as an isolated consequence of criminality; it often represents the endpoint of a longer chain of gendered disadvantage. Poverty, social marginalisation, unequal access to legal representation and discriminatory treatment within the justice system can shape women’s pathways into imprisonment long before they enter a prison cell. This reflects exactly the kind of discrimination the CEDAW’s Article 1 aims to capture. Indian scholarship on women’s imprisonment, including work by Kamthan and Cherukuri, identifies the male-centric assumptions embedded within criminological theory itself as a starting point for the problem [Cherukuri, 2009]. For example, Kamthan argues that the dominant frameworks used to theorise imprisonment in India were developed with reference to male offending patterns, leaving women’s experiences of the system unexamined and their specific vulnerabilities unaddressed within the discipline meant to explain incarceration [Kamthan, 2018]. The prison, therefore, is not simply where a woman’s rights become restricted; it can be where pre-existing rights become concentrated and made visible. Recent research estimates that close to three-quarters of  imprisoned women in India belong to marginalised castes and classes, a pattern reflected in the  overrepresentation of women from Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) within the female prison population [Shah, 2024]. This layered marginalisation has been described as a ‘triple’ disadvantage: Indian women prisoners are stigmatised as women, as persons in conflict with the law and, within the justice system itself, as a minority whose needs are addressed only as an afterthought to a system designed around men [Pandey, 2021]. This pattern mirrors, at the domestic level, precisely the dynamic Charlesworth and Chinkin identify at the international level: a system built without women’s realities in view, into which protection is retrofitted only once its absence becomes impossible to ignore [Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, 1991]. 

This structural pattern is perpetuated once women are incarcerated and maps onto three specific failures the CEDAW Committee identifies in General Recommendations No. 33: a lack of gender sensitive non-custodial alternatives to detention; a failure to meet women’s specific needs within detention; and an absence of gender-sensitive monitoring mechanisms [CEDAW, 2015]. On the first point, India’s own data illustrates the problem starkly: according to the National Crime Records Bureau’s (NCRB) Prison Statistics India 2022 report, women constituted only around 4.1-4.4% of India’s total prison population, yet 76.33% of women prisoners were undertrials awaiting the conclusion of their cases [Ministry of Home Affairs, 2023]. This is a marginally higher proportion than the 75.8% undertrial rate recorded across the prison population as a whole. This indicates a routine reliance on pre-trial detention rather than non-custodial alternatives.

Secondly, national prison occupancy stood at approximately 120-131% of sanctioned capacity across this period, reflecting acute and chronic overcrowding [Ministry of Home Affairs, 2023]. Yet this overcrowding does not fall evenly. Earlier NCRB data shows that women’s prisons have historically operated at markedly lower occupancy than general facilities. One study found that women’s jails filled to only 57.98% of sanctioned capacity nationally, and as low as 25.58% in Tamil Nadu, even as men’s facilities ran close to or above full capacity [Pandey, 2021]. The same study found only 24 dedicated women’s prisons across the country by the end of 2018, housing under 17% of women prisons, with 21 states and union territories possessing no women-only facility at all despite the Model Prison Manual’s stated goal of one such facility per state [Pandey, 2021]. Most incarcerated women are instead held within enclosures inside prisons designed for men, frequently far from their home districts, in direct tension with the Bangkok Rules’ requirements on facility design, healthcare access, and searches and supervision by appropriately trained female staff. Staffing accentuates this vulnerability, where women made up only around 11% of jail staff nationally, and just 252 of 1914 medical staff working in Indian prisons were women. This creates conditions in which women’s searches, medical examinations and day-to-day supervision are frequently conducted by men, contrary to the gender-sensitive staffing standard the Bangkok Rules were specifically drafted to secure. The human consequences of this environment were made starkly visible in 2017, when Majula Shetye, an inmate at Byculla women’s prison in Mumbai, died after being allegedly assaulted by prison staff. Her death triggered a riot amongst roughly 200 fellow inmates, led to murder charges against 6 jail officials and prompted a parliamentary committee visit to the jail [The Wire, 2018]. This committee documented insanitary food, poor hygiene facilities and routine physical mistreatment of women prisoners by staff, precisely the gender sensitive monitoring failure General Recommendation No. 33 warns against.  

In the continued absence of the CEDAW provision addressing detention, Indian courts have periodically supplied limited and conditional protection to women prisoners through constitutional interpretation, a domestic echo of the interpretive move the CEDAW Committee itself performed in Abromova. In R.D. Upadhyay v State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court, invoking the right to life and dignity under Article 21, issued binding guidelines on the  treatment of children living in prison with their incarcerated mothers, including entitlements to food, shelter, medical care, clothing and education, and directing that such children not be treated as undertrials or convicts in their own right [Supreme Court of India, 2006]. In Sukanya Shantha v Union of India, decided in 2024, the Supreme Court struck down caste-based segregation and labour allocation in state prison manuals as unconstitutional, while specifically noting that the Model Prison Manual’s chapter addressing women prisoners already prohibited caste-based classification, in contrast to the absence of any equivalent safeguard for male prisoners, an asymmetry the Court itself found troubling [Supreme Court of India, 2024]. These two judgments show that the Supreme Court is willing to take protective measures when cases regarding the state of prisons are brought to it. They also show  that the manner in which the Court does this is not by looking at what the country’s international law obligations are, but rather by simply interpreting certain provisions of the constitution.  

This reliance on domestic judicial patching is not simply a matter of preference; it reflects the  absence of any alternative route back to the international framework itself. India ratified the CEDAW in 1993 and the ICCPR shortly after its adoption but has ratified neither the Optional Protocol to CEDAW nor the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, meaning Indian women have no access to the individual communications procedure through which the CEDAW  Committee reached its finding in Abramova. As one recent analysis has asked directly, ratifying the Optional Protocol could meaningfully strengthen India’s due diligence obligations under ther CEDAW by exposing individual cases to international scrutiny, yet India has consistently declined to do so [Shritha, 2022]. The consequence is that whatever interpretive expansion the CEDAW has undergone internationally through General Recommendation No. 33 and instruments like the Bangkok Rules remains, for Indian women in prison, they are entirely unenforceable through the mechanism that gives it teeth elsewhere. The domestic courts are not simply the primary route to protection; they are the only route available. 

Yet even this domestic route has not translated reliably into enforcement. Nearly two decades after R.D. Upadhyay, a 2024 assessment of prison nursery conditions concluded that the Supreme Court’s guidelines, ‘while aspirational, have failed to fulfil their intended purpose’, with implementation continuing to vary sharply across states [Shritha, 2024]. This gap between judicial pronouncement and administrative reality is instructive for the paper’s broader argument. This judicial patching, like the Committee’s own interpretive work, generates guidance rather than enforceable entitlement in practice: guidelines depend for their effect on state-level administrative capacity and political will that, as the persistent overcrowding, understaffing and uneven implementation reviewed above demonstrate, remain in short supply, and India’s non-ratification of the relevant optional protocols forecloses the one avenue that might otherwise supply external pressure toward compliance. India’s gap is therefore not primarily a gap in legal recognition; it is a gap in implementation and enforceability, layered onto the prior social and structural discrimination that brought many of these women into contact with the  justice system in the first place. 

India’s gap is not one of legal recognition but of enforceability. Courts have read protection into the constitution where the CEDAW stays silent, but with no Optional Protocol access and guidelines that remain, by the government’s own admission, largely unimplemented, that protection rarely reaches the women it names. The United Kingdom offers a different test for the same underlying claim. Where India’s gap is best explained by weak implementation capacity layered into prior social disadvantage, the UK cannot be explained this way at all. It is a wealthy, high-capacity state with a mature and well-resourced criminal justice system, yet it exhibits a strikingly similar pattern of gender blind design in its treatment of women in prison. If India’s shortfall could plausibly be attributed  to resource scarcity, the UK cannot. Unlike India’s courts, which have shown some willingness to read constitutional protections into the treatment of women prisoners, the UK’s strict dualist tradition means the CEDAW, the ICCPR and the Bangkok Rules carry no domestic legal force at all unless Parliament chooses to legislate them in. Reform of the criminal justice system in the UK has therefore proceeded almost entirely through a parallel domestic track. This raises the  question of what international law has contributed to protecting women in the UK’s criminal  justice system at all.

Case Study: UK

The treatment of women in the UK criminal justice system highlights the gap between gender-sensitive reform and its legal implementation. Women make up less than 5% of  the prison population in England and Wales [House of Commons, 2022]. A population this small can see their needs being overlooked within a criminal justice system historically designed around a much larger male population. Women frequently enter the criminal justice system with  complex needs linked to poverty, domestic and sexual abuse, trauma, mental health difficulties, substance misuse and homelessness [Prison Reforms Trust, n.d.]. This demonstrates that women’s offending pathways are often connected to wider social inequalities rather than being solely the result of individual criminal behaviour. Marginalisation also continues within custody, where women may have distinct healthcare, mental health and family-contact needs that are not adequately addressed by a system historically structured around male prisoners. The HM Inspectorate of Prisons has reported that the rate of self-harm among women in prison was 8.5 times higher than among men, highlighting the consequences of inadequate gender-sensitive provision [HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2025].

The Corston Report (2007) was influential in recognising the distinct circumstances of women offenders, highlighting how women often enter the criminal justice system through pathways shaped by abuse, poverty mental health difficulties and substance misuse. It argued that the criminal justice system should respond to these gender-specific needs by reserving custody primarily  for women who pose a serious risk, while using community-based sentences to address the underlying factors contributing to their offending. This report is relevant to the Convention as it reflects that treating men and women identically within a criminal justice system does not necessarily produce equality in the system. They require different forms of intervention to achieve equality. The principles identified by Corston continued to influence later policy and culminated in the publication of the Female Offender Strategy in 2018 [Ministry of Justice, 2018]. The strategy represented a significant development because it formally adopted a gender considerate approach to women in the criminal justice system; it placed greater emphasis on women’s centres, community provision and agency support, and the UK government announced funding for community services aiming to divert vulnerable women from custody. Against the background of the report, the absence of the CEDAW [CEDAW, 1981] from the UK’s domestic criminal justice debate becomes significant as the UK’s reform trajectory suggests that the Convention has not been a significant mechanism through which gender-sensitive reform has been developed, but rather the reform has been driven primarily by the Corston Report and the government’s strategies and evidence concerning women’s experiences in the criminal  justice system. However, this does not mean that the CEDAW is completely absent from UK policies; rather, it provides a broader legal framework through which gender discrimination can be assessed, but the UK’s reform has been shaped much more directly by the policy instruments [Justice Committee, 2013].  

Overall, the UK demonstrates that gender sensitive reform can develop through domestic  policy and evidence-based approaches where the CEDAW has had limited influence on the justice system. The Corston Report and the Female Offender Strategy recognised that women’s experiences of offending are shaped by disadvantages and therefore require responses that go beyond testing men and women equally. While the Corston Report emphasised community-based approaches and addressing the underlying causes of women’s offending, the Female Offender Strategy built on this by promoting early intervention, community sentences and  gender-responsive services. However, the limited direct use of the CEDAW within these reforms raises questions about how effectively the Convention has translated its principles of substantive equality and non-discrimination into practice. This provides an important basis for comparison with India, where the CEDAW does not have more visible influence on legal and judicial approaches.

Both countries recognise that women who conflict with the law face gender-specific vulnerabilities through which the reform has developed significantly. Comparing the UK’s primarily policy-driven approach with India’s greater engagement with international human rights standards can therefore demonstrate the extent to which the CEDAW has influenced meaningful reform, rather than simply providing a broader framework for identifying discrimination. This comparison ultimately highlights that the effectiveness of the CEDAW depends not only on the rights and principles contained within the Convention, but also on how far those principles are incorporated into domestic law, policy and institutional practice.

Comparative Analysis

Having examined India and the United Kingdom separately, this section compares the two cases in relation to the paper’s central claim: that ratification of the CEDAW, the ICCPR and the Bangkok Rules does not, by itself, guarantee effective protection for women in detention. Instead, outcomes depend largely on how international obligations are incorporated into domestic law and on the social conditions that shape women’s contact with the justice system. India and the UK are useful comparisons because both have ratified the relevant treaties, while differing significantly in legal tradition, judicial practice and institutional capacity. Despite these differences, both show a gap between international commitments and the lived experiences of women in detention. 

There are important similarities between the two jurisdictions. Both criminal justice systems have historically been structured around male experiences, meaning that women’s specific needs have often been addressed through later reforms rather than being built into the system itself. Women’s pathways into the criminal justice system are also shaped by wider forms of disadvantage. In India, caste, class and social discrimination can contribute to women’s  imprisonment, while the Corston Report identified abuse, poverty and coercion as important factors in women’s offending in England and Wales. In both countries, practical protection has  also relied more heavily on measures outside the binding text of the CEDAW, including the Bangkok Rules, General Recommendation No. 33 and domestic policy reforms. However, implementation remains uneven. Indian prison guidelines have been criticised for poor implementation, while the UK’s Female Offender Strategy has also faced criticism over the clarity and effectiveness of its implementation. 

The main difference lies in how international obligations operate domestically. In India, courts have used constitutional protections to strengthen the rights of women prisoners, including in cases such as R.D. Upadhyay and Sukanya Shantha. However, India has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW or the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, limiting access to international individual complaints procedures such as that used in Abramova v Belarus. This  means that judicial interpretation remains particularly important in giving international standards practical effect. 

The UK presents a different problem. Under its dualist system, treaties such as the CEDAW and the ICCPR do not automatically create enforceable domestic rights. Their influence therefore depends on Parliament choosing to incorporate their obligations into domestic law. As a result, reforms concerning women in the criminal justice system have largely developed through domestic initiatives such as the Corston Report and Female Offender Strategy rather than  through direct reliance on the CEDAW. The comparison therefore suggests that ratification alone tells us little about the protection women receive. Despite their different legal systems and levels of institutional capacity, both countries continue to experience a gap between international commitments and domestic protection.

Conclusion

Taken together, these findings support the paper’s central argument more powerfully than either case study could alone. India’s experience demonstrates that judicial willingness to engage with international norms, on its own, cannot close this gap without either international enforcement or adequate domestic capacity behind it. The United Kingdom’s experience demonstrates the converse: that capacity alone cannot close it either, where the domestic legal architecture foreclosed any binding role for international law from the outset. Substantive equality, the standard this paper has applied throughout, asks not whether a state has signed a text but whether that text produces real, felt protection for the women it claims to cover; measured  against that standard, both India and the United Kingdom fall short, for opposite reasons, arriving at the same result by refusing the same thing in different disguises. What connects the two cases, then, is not a shared success or a shared failure of the CEDAW, the ICCPR or the Bangkok Rules as texts: it is a shared demonstration that the real determinant of protection lies beyond the instruments themselves, in the domestic structures that decide, quietly and almost  invisibly, whether an international commitment is ever given the chance to matter at all. Ratification opens a door; only domestic law decides whether anyone is permitted to walk through it.

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